As the Nats get ready for Bryce Harper to return next week, the team faces its first major roster quandary of this season. Over the last three weeks, Ryan Zimmerman has proved to be a reasonably good left fielder while filling in for Bryce, but now decisions will need to be made about where to play him and how that will impact the rest of the lineup.
The two main choices are to move him back to third base, Anthony Rendon to second, and Danny Espinosa to the bench, or to keep Zimmerman in left field, move Harper to center, and Denard Span to the bench.
If Zim is capable of playing third base adequately, logic argues in favor of moving him there and sitting Espinosa. Simply put, Span is a good player and Espinosa isn’t. For example, the projections available from FanGraphs show Span with a projected slash line of .273/.323/.380 (close to a league average hitter, plus above-average defense) and Espinosa with a slash line of .221/.283/.361, which is about as low as it gets for players with significant projected playing time.
Of course, other variations could be used on occasion—Zimmerman might occasionally give Adam LaRoche a day off at first base, or let Harper move to right to give Jayson Werth a day off. But those variations, barring an injury, would be used only on occasion to keep the team rested.
So the big question is whether Zim can still play third base. If he can, I’d suggest a somewhat unusual platoon arrangement. Espinosa hits much better against left-handers, so I’d suggest playing Zimmerman at third against right-handers, and move Harper to center and sit Span against lefties. Espinosa’s career slash line against right-handers is a terrible .217/.288/.369, but against lefties it’s an impressive .266/.338/.457. Span, on the other hand, doesn’t have much of a platoon differential, but he lacks Espinosa’s power against southpaws.
The Nats’ other roster puzzle (at least to me) is their utilization of Ross Detwiler. In Tuesday’s night’s 16-inning marathon, he pitched 4 scoreless innings to keep the game tied—probably the Nats’ single most impressive relief appearance this season, which allowed Zimmerman to eventually hit the winning home run. But overall, Detwiler’s season has been pretty horrible—his opponents’ slash line of .290/.389/.442 indicates that he’s probably been even worse than suggested by his 4.36 ERA.
With the poor performance has come a willingness to use Detwiler mainly in low leverage situations when the team is either several runs behind or has a large lead. Of his 21 appearances, 14 have come with a leverage index of .75 or less (that is, a low leverage situation), with 12 of these in situations where the Nats were down by 3 or more runs or up by 5 or more runs. Tuesday’s extra-inning marathon (leverage index of 2.52) was his only appearance with a leverage index greater than 1.50. (Note—a leverage index of 1.00 represents an “average” situation.)
Detwiler hasn’t taken well to relief and still aspires to be a starter, but that isn’t going to happen with the Nationals, who have brought in Blake Treinen or Taylor Jordan when they needed a replacement starter. He’s being paid $3 million this season, which seems like a lot for a player in such a marginal role. His fasball velocity is still fine, but he relies on it too much. With a season and a half until free agency, I think it may make sense to try to trade him. Perhaps another team thinks it can succeed where the Nats have failed, in developing another pitch and allowing him to move back into the rotation. Without Detwiler, the Nats could move Treinen or Taylor Hill into the long-relief role, or bring up Xavier Cedeno as a lefty specialist. Detwiler wouldn’t bring much back in a trade, but I still think it may be better for both him and the Nats to trade him.
The Nats got off to a lackluster start as the injuries mounted and the defense sputtered. One of their starters was consistently inconsistent. Meanwhile, the Braves raced out of the gate to a solid early lead in the NL East. Unfortunately this seems like an ominous sequel to the start of the 2013 season.
The Nats started the season with Doug Fister on the disabled list with a lat strain, with Taylor Jordan moving into the fifth starter role. They opened the season, and Matt Williams’ tenure as manager, playing the Mets in New York City. They swept the series, with a notable come-from-behind win in ten innings in the opener. Unfortunately, it was also a costly win, as Wilson Ramos suffered a broken hamate bone in his left hand, placing him on the DL.
Returning to Washington for the home opener against the Braves, the Nationals lost the first two before getting a win in the third game. They fared better against in their next series against Miami, sweeping the series and ending the home stand in first place with a 7–2 record. Scott Hairston went on the DL with an oblique strain.
The team’s next series was in Atlanta, and the Nats were swept by the Braves and were knocked out of the lead. Ryan Zimmerman fractured his right thumb diving into second base on a pickoff play, and Denard Span went on the 7-day concussion DL after a base path collision. Moving on to Miami, the Nats took two of three from the Marlins.
Next came the Nats’ longest home stand of the season. Facing the Cardinals, they split a four-game series. They lost the next series to the Angels, two games to one. Jordan gave up Albert Pujols’ 500th home run. The home stand ended with a four-game series against the Padres, which the Nats again split. But this series was also a costly one, as Bryce Harper suffered a torn ligament in his thumb on a headfirst slide into third base and had to undergo surgery. The Nats’ record on their home stand was 5–6, which wasn’t what the Nats had been hoping for.
The month of April ended in Houston, where the Nats swept a two-game set with the Astros, while the Braves were losing to the Marlins. At the end of the month, the Nats had a 16–12 record and were in third place, two games back of the 17–9 Braves and slightly trailing the 15–11 Mets in the percentage standings (.577 to .571). According to the Baseball Prospectus playoff odds report, the Nats finished the month with a 49.6% chance of winning the division and a 71.8% chance of making the playoffs. FanGraphs, using the “projection mode,” showed probabilities that were a bit more optimistic (56.8% for the division and 80.6% for the playoffs), though with “season to date stats” mode the odds were quite a bit lower (29.7% for the division and 51.2% for the playoffs).
Despite the injuries, the team’s offense played well, finishing tied for second in the National League in runs scored with 126 and second in weighted runs created relative to league (wRC+) with 108 (that is, they created 8% more runs than the average team, taking account of park effects and quality of the league). Defense, on the other hand, is measured by many metrics and for this month all of the metrics were in agreement—the Nats were the worst defensive team in the NL. They had the worst fielding percentage (.975), the lowest defensive efficiency (.661; that is, only 66.1% of balls in play were converted to outs), the lowest defensive runs saved (–12), and the worst UZR (–14.2).
The starters’ ERA– (earned run average adjusted for park and league quality) was 107 (that is, 7% worse than average), ranking 9th in the NL. The poor defense obviously hurt their performance in terms of runs allowed, and the starters fared much better on the fielding independent measures, with a FIP– of 85 (15% better than the league), which ranked third, and an xFIP– of 91, which was second in the league. The relievers had an ERA– of 61 (39% better than the league average), which ranked second. Their FIP– of 80 ranked third, and their xFIP– of 88 ranked fourth.
Record:
16-12 (.571)
Pythagorean Record:
16-12 (4.50 R/G – 3.86 RA/G)
April MVP:
Jayson Werth (.288/.383/.462, 28 G, 120 PA, 4 HR, 16 R, 16 RBI, 0.7 fWAR, 9.64 RE24, 1.78 WPA) edges out Anthony Rendon (.316/.352/.544, 19 R, 20 RBI, 0.8 fWAR) and Adam LaRoche (.312/.413/.495, 17 R, 17 RBI, 0.7 fWAR) on the basis of his exceptional clutch hitting.
Most valuable pitcher:
Tanner Roark (2-0, 2.76 RA/9, 5 G, 32-2/3 IP, 7.2 K/9, 2.5 BB/9, 4.63 RE24, 1.1 rWAR) edges out Gio Gonzalez (3–1, 3.25 RA/9, 6 G, 36 IP, 0.9 rWAR).
Most valuable reliever:
Rafael Soriano (1-0, 5 SV, 0.00 RA/9, 10 G, 10 IP, 10.8 K/9, 3.6 BB/9, 5.4 H/9, 4.43 RE24, 0.74 WPA, 5 shutdowns, 0 meltdown).
Worst month:
Taylor Jordan (0–3, 7.01 RA/9, –7.10 RE24, 5 G, 25-2/3 IP, 6.0 K/9, 2.8 BB/9, 11.9 H/9, 3 HR, 60.3% LOB%). Tyler Clippard (6 meltdowns, 2–2, 5.68 RA/9, –3.74 RE24, –1.38 WPA, 3 shutdowns, 6 meltdowns) is runner up.
League leaders:
Jayson Werth led the majors in clutch hitting in April with 1.78 WPA (win probability added). Stephen Strasburg led the majors in strikeout rate with 14.03 K/9. Rafael Soriano was one of five major league relievers with an ERA of 0.00 for the month. On the other side of the ledger, Strasburg also led the majors in batting average allowed on balls in play (BABIP) with .407. Tyler Clippard had the worst clutch performance of all major league relievers as measured both by number of meltdowns (6) and WPA (–1.38). Ian Desmond led the majors in fielding errors with 8.
Best start this month:
Tanner Roark (April 26, 4–0 win over the Padres at home) in the first complete game of his career, pitched a three-hit shutout with 8 strikeouts and 1 walks with a game score of 88.
Worst start:
Jordan Zimmermann (April 9, 10–7 win over the Marlins at home) lasted only 1-2/3 innings and gave up 7 hits, 5 runs, 2 walks, and a home run, while getting only 1 K and a game score of 20. The Nats bullpen held on to give up only two more runs, and the offense came back to take the lad on a Werth grand slam home run in the bottom of the 8th.
Tough loss:
Jordan Zimmermann (April 19, 4–3 loss to the Cardinals at home) gave up 4 runs—only 1 of them earned—on 7 hits with 2 walks and 6 strikeouts in 7 innings (game score 57).
Cheap win: (none)
Best shutdown:
Drew Storen (April 18, 3–1 win over the Cardinals at home) got the call to put out a fire when he relieved Clippard in the 8th inning with one out and runners on second and third, and a 3–1 lead on the line. He got Matt Holliday to foul out and Allen Craig to ground out to get out of the inning and end the threat. (Win probability added .216).
Worst meltdown:
Tyler Clippard (April 21, 4–2 loss to the Angels at home) entered in the top of the 8th protecting a 1–0 lead. Pujols led off and reached on a Desmond error. Clippard struck out the next batter, but Pujols stole second and advanced to third on an infield single. The next batter popped out, but then Clippard gave up a single to Aybar that scored Pujols, followed by a walk and then a double by Ibanez that scored all three runners. He left the game with a 4–1 deficit, Ibanez on third, and still only two outs. (Win probability added –.699)
Clutch hit:
Jayson Werth (April 23, 5–4 win over the Angels at home). Werth came to bat in the bottom of the ninth with one out, Rendon and Span on first and second, and the Nats trailing 4–2. On a 3–0 count, he hit a double into the left field corner and scored both runners, tying the game (WPA .506). LaRoche was the next batter and drove Werth in for the walk-off win.
Choke:
Jose Lobaton (April 24, 4–3 loss to the Padres at home) came to bat in the bottom of the 12th inning with one out, Harper on second base, and the Nats trailing 4–3. He lined out to the shortstop and Harper couldn’t make it back to the base, ending the game (WPA –.267).
I’ve been a strong proponent of instant replay review, so I’m surprised to find that after our first week of expanded review, I’m starting to have second thoughts.
During spring training (I have to admit that I only watched of spring training games) I heard reports that the reviews went pretty quickly, so I was surprised at how irritating the one-or-two minute delays are turning out to be. While I’d love to ensure that the umpire’s decisions are more accurate, I’m also a proponent of faster games. It seems to be hard to advocate for one without the other.
The rules seem smart—there’s a limit of one review per team, unless the team wins a challenge, in which case they get another one. That helps limit the number of challenges, but also gives an incentive to use the challenge in cases where the team thinks it’s going to win. As Adam Kilgore of the Washington Post observes, managers also have an incentive to hold their challenges for high leverage plays—plays where the score is close and there are runners on base with the potential to score. I’m actually fine with that—if we’re going to only be reviewing a few plays, I’d rather that they be the ones that really make a difference.
The challenge in the season opener, however, illustrates a scenario when the incentives work the other direction. In the top of the tenth inning, the Nats had just taken a 9 to 5 lead on Anthony Rendon‘s home run. Danny Espinosa came to bat with two outs and the bases empty (a very low leverage situation) and grounded to third. The throw pulled Duda off the bag, but he swiped Espinosa as he ran past. Matt Williams challenged the play, despite the fact that the play was very unlikely to affect the outcome of the game, because if he didn’t use his challenge then, he would lose it.
The game had already lasted nearly 3-1/2 hours, so I was pretty irritated by the additional delay. Is there a way to change the rules to discourage managers from using challenges in low leverage situations? One way might be to give managers not only a limit of one per game, but also a limitation on the number used in the season. If Williams had been limited to maybe 60 challenges per season, I think he would have held off on that challenge to try to use it in a more meaningful situation in another game. (Please note that I am not proposing that managers who save challenges be allowed to use more than one per game. Both the one-per-game and 60-per-season restrictions would apply.) Alternatively, an even simpler rule would be to simply say that a team can’t use a challenge if they have a lead of 4 or more runs.
Ok, so I’m looking to tweak some rules to cut back on certain uses of challenges. Are there any cases where I can see additional expansion of replay challenges? Actually, yes there are.
I’ve always been concerned that umpires do a pretty poor job with check swing calls, despite the fact that they’re calling on another umpire for assistance. I’d guess that their error rates are at least twice as high for check swing calls as for other calls of balls and strikes. Check swings, however, seem like something that could be automated. If cameras were set up in fixed locations and computers were programmed to instantly replay and analyze the check swing, I’d bet that the compute could give quick, accurate, and reliable calls. The home plate umpire is already asking for help on these calls; it really doesn’t seem a stretch for them to get the help from a camera/computer combination. If an automated program could be written that could analyze and report a decision within 10 seconds (which I think might be feasible), I’d support turning check swing calls over to machines (obviously with a quick visual check to make sure the machine is doing what we think it should be doing.)
It will take us a while to get used to expanded instant replay review, but in the long run it will just be one of the many minor changes that have slipped into the game over time. I’m glad that MLB has been trying to refine it.
I’ve been doing this blog for nearly three years now, but I think this is my first season preview article. My general approach to this blog is to try to do stuff that other Nats blogs aren’t doing. We’ll see if that works for this post.
In thinking about the Nats’ prospects for 2014, I think about how similar this team is to the one that started the 2013 season 12 months ago—7 of the 8 regular position players, the top 3 starters, and the 4 pitchers who constitute the core of the bullpen are all the same. Only the bench looks significantly different. I remember I was projecting last year’s team for about 91 wins… how does this year’s team compare?
Since the team is so similar, mostly we’re comparing the prospects of individual players with the prospects of those same players a year ago. And the worrisome news is that in most cases, I’m seeing reductions in their projected performance. Ryan Zimmerman? He now looks like a liability as a third baseman. Adam LaRoche? His 2012 season is looking more like a fluke, and we’re wondering if he’ll ever be even an average first baseman again. Stephen Strasburg? While he didn’t have a bad season, I notice he’s no longer showing up in the conversation when people talk about the top ten pitchers in baseball. Gio Gonzalez? He also took a step backwards. Ross Detwiler? With health issues and inconsistency, he stepped all the way off the rotation. Drew Storen? Rafael Soriano? They each took a huge step backwards. Denard Span? While I think he suffered more from unrealistic expectations and was seen as the scapegoat by too many fans, I have to agree that this year’s expectations are lower. Danny Espinosa? More like several giant leaps backward, moving from regular to bench player.
Some other players project about the same this season as last. I’d put Bryce Harper in this category. Whereas last spring we were worried about a sophomore slump, this spring we’re worried about him staying healthy. But I see his chances for a breakout season as about the same that I thought they were 12 months ago. I also see Tyler Clippard and Craig Stammen as about the same as a year ago.
Finally, there are a handful of players who project a little higher. Two have moved up quite a bit: Ian Desmond and Jordan Zimmermann. Desmond actually didn’t hit as well last season as he did in 2012, but a year ago we still had a lot of questions whether he was a one-season fluke; now we believe he really is this good. Zimmermann quietly put together an excellent season. Jayson Werth also put together his best season since he left the Phillies, but I wouldn’t say his projection is much higher than what it was last spring. After all, he’s also another year older now, and his defense has continued to slip. Wilson Ramos also demonstrated that he’d come back from his injury, so his prospects are better than they were a year ago.
So looking at all of the returning players that are still here a year later, I have to say that the Nats’ prospects as a team look worse—the handful of players who’ve improved don’t offset the large number whose projections simply aren’t as bright. But there is another partial offset – the new players that have joined the team, in comparison to the players who’ve left.
In general, I think the new players help offset the losses among the existing core. Doug Fister certainly seems like he should be an improvement on Dan Haren (knock on wood). Anthony Rendon has been a pleasant surprise, as have Tanner Roark and Taylor Jordan. Nate McLouth and Kevin Frandsen seem like upgrades compared to last season’s bench.
So on the whole, I’m willing to project this year’s team as close to, but not quite as good as last season’s team. Last season, I projected them at 91 wins, so this season I’m going to project them at 89 wins. (That’s also close to where the statistics sites are projecting them—FanGraphs has them projected at 89 wins, and Baseball Prospectus has them at 87.6 wins.) If the Braves had stayed healthy, I’d have seen the Nats as neck-and-neck with Atlanta, but with the injuries to Medlen and Beachy, I now think the Nats have the clear edge.
Dave Nichols of the Washington DC Chapter of the Internet Baseball Writers Association sent around a pre-season survey, which I completed. For the full results, see the DC-IBWAA website. Here are my responses:
Since my last post with my thoughts on the Nats’ lineup, I ran across a site, Baseball Musings, that has a lineup optimizer. If you type in your assumptions for each player’s on-base and slugging percentages, it tells you how man runs per game to expect from the lineup you’ve entered, and also spits out the best lineups (roughly 25 of them) and the worst lineups.
Using the same assumptions as in my last post (the projections from FanGraphs with a 9.8% platoon factor for the left-handers and a 6.1% platoon factor for the right-handers; for pitchers, I used the Nationals’ pitcher batting statistics from last season), here are the “optimum” lineups. Actually, the website gives two sets of lineups, based on two different periods on which their model was estimated. This first set of lineups is based on data from 1989-2002:
vs. RHP (4.627 R/G)
1. Jayson Werth
2. Bryce Harper
3. Anthony Rendon
4. Ryan Zimmerman
5. Adam LaRoche
6. Wilson Ramos
7. Ian Desmond
8. Pitcher
9. Denard Span
vs. LHP (4.665 R/G)
1. Werth
2. Zimmerman
3. Rendon
4. Harper
5. Ramos
6. LaRoche
7. Desmond
8. Pitcher
9. Span
In contrast, the optimizer said that the lineups I proposed in my last post were worth only 4.418 R/G vs RHP and 4.464 R/G vs. LHP. Now the analysis says that the lineup that Matt Williams seems inclined to go with (1. Span, 2. Rendon, 3. Werth, 4. Zimmerman, 5. Harper, 6. Desmond, 7. LaRoche, 8. Ramos, 9. Pitcher) does even worse, 4.413 R/G vs. RHP and 4.396 R/G vs. LHP.
However, when we run the same assumptions through their other sample period, 1959–2004, we get quite different results:
vs. RHP (4.525 R/G)
1. Werth
2. Harper
3. Ramos
4. Zimmerman
5. LaRoche
6. Rendon
7. Span
8. Desmond
9. Pitcher
vs. LHP (4.563 R/G)
1. Werth
2. Zimmerman
3. Ramos
4. Rendon !
5. Harper
6. LaRoche
7. Span
8. Desmond
9. Pitcher
Rendon as cleanup hitter certainly was a surprise! Also, the optimizer doesn’t ask for handedness, so it doesn’t know that it lined up the Nats’ three left-handed hitters in a row. Looking over some of the other high-ranked lineups, this alternative is estimated to result in only .004 fewer R/G and avoids having the lefties all in a row: 1. Werth, 2. Zimmerman, 3. Desmond, 4. Harper, 5. Ramos, 6. Span, 7. Rendon, 8. LaRoche, 9. Pitcher.
Against these alternatives, my suggestions from the last post are worse, but not by nearly as large a margin (4.491 R/G vs. RHP and 4.517 R/G vs. LHP). The “Matt Williams” lineup is also only a little worse (4.477 R/G vs. RHP and 4.494 R/G vs. LHP). So the results from the longer time span seem to support the idea that lineups don’t make that much difference, whereas from the shorter time span, it seems to make quite a lot of difference.
Do I believe the Baseball Musings model? Actually, I’ve got some problems with their methodology. They base their model on linear regression analysis based on a model with two explanatory variables, OBP and SLG. The most common problem with regression models is that when there are additional variables that affect the dependent variable (in this case, runs per game), and they are left out of the model, the estimated coefficients of the variables that are included are going to be biased. In this case, it’s easy to think what some of those excluded variables might be—base running, for example.
Another model, the Markov model, is less affected by this problem, and it’s the model that was used in The Book: Playing the Percentages in Baseball by Tango, Lichtman, and Dolphin. It looks like it would be feasible to develop a similar script that could generate optimal lineups based on the Markov approach, and frankly, I’d trust that model a lot more. But the main message that comes through from all of this is that Span really shouldn’t be leading off any more.
Ok … I admit it … I find spring training boring. Sure, there’s baseball being played (of a sort). But the decisions being made are about the fifth starter, the last spot in the bullpen, and the last spot on the bench. You wait all winter for spring training, and then you wait another six weeks for real baseball.
But sportswriters have to keep writing, so this is the time of year when we get the fluff pieces and personality profiles. But, as token analysis, we usually also get an article or two about construction of the Nats’ lineup.
This blog leans toward sabermetrics, and sabermetricians have written a lot about constructing lineups. Actually, the main thing they all agree on is that lineups don’t matter all that much. Poorly designed lineups usually cost, at most, maybe five or ten runs a season. Nevertheless, it’s still interesting to see what research says about lineups, and how far most actual lineups are from the ideal.
I’ll work with the rules from The Book: Playing the Percentages in Baseball by “Tom M Tango” (better known as tangotiger), Mitchel G Lichtman, and Andrew E Dolphin, though I’ve read a number of other articles that reach generally similar conclusions. Here are a couple of their rules:
Rule #1: Your three best hitters should bat somewhere in the #1, #2, and #4 slots. Your fourth- and fifth-best hitters should occupy the #3 and #5 slots. The #1 and #2 slots will have players with more walks than those in the #4 and #5 slots. From slot #6 through #9, put the players in descending order of quality.
Notice that they don’t want you to lead off with the slap hitter who steals a lot of bases. Where do you put the base stealer?
Rule #3: If you need to leverage a basestealer, put him in front of a batter who hits lots of singles and doesn’t strikeout much. The likelihood is that your basestealer will be batting fifth or sixth.
How would I apply these rules to the Nationals lineup? First, I want to focus on projected hitting ability rather than on past hitting ability. Decision making should always be forward looking rather than backwards. We’re interested in how players are likely to hit in 2014, not in how they’ve hit in past seasons. Fortunately, projections are widely available. I’ll use the ones from FanGraphs, which are based on an average of Steamer and Zips projections.
Second, because almost all players have significant platoon splits, I’ve constructed separate lineups for use against right-handed and left-handed pitchers. For the platoon splits, I’ve used common factors, rather than trying to estimate separate platoon factors for each hitter. The factors I used were 9.8% for left-handed hitters (that is, their wOBA, or weighted on-base average, is assumed to be 9.8% higher against right-handed pitchers than against left-handed pitchers), and 6.1% for right-handed hitters, with these numbers taken from a 2013 study by Bojan Koprivica.
I basically followed Rule #1, with one additional rule—I tried to avoid placing left-handed hitters adjacent to each other, to cut down the ability of the opposing team to leverage their left-handed relief pitchers. Here are my suggested lineups, with each player’s projected wOBA adjusted for handedness in parentheses:
Versus right-handed pitchers:
1. Jayson Werth (.349)
2. Adam LaRoche (.339)
3. Wilson Ramos (.326)
4. Bryce Harper (.384)
5. Ryan Zimmerman (.345)
6. Anthony Rendon (.325)
7. Ian Desmond (.321)
8. Denard Span (.319)
Versus left-handed pitchers:
1. Bryce Harper (.350)
2. Ryan Zimmerman (.366)
3. Wilson Ramos (.346)
4. Jayson Werth (.370)
5. Anthony Rendon (.345)
6. Adam LaRoche (.308)
7. Ian Desmond (.341)
8. Denard Span (.291)
These lineups, of course, are not at all similar to what I expect to actually see. First, I show Denard Span, who will almost certainly bat leadoff for the Nats, as the worst hitter in the lineup and better suited for batting 8th. Could this be correct? Absolutely – his wOBAs over the last four seasons have been .307, .308, .325, and .313. While that’s actually not bad for a good defensive center fielder, it’s clearly the worst of any of the Nats’ regulars. Look, back in 2008 and 2009, Span was a fine leadoff hitter. But that was then, and the team needs to evaluate him on what he can do now. Please, I’m not criticizing Span (in fact, last season I was ready to nominate him for the All-Star team), but we need to recognize that he’s valuable for his defense, not as a leadoff hitter.
Now, I admit that neither Werth nor Harper is a classic leadoff hitter. The problem, however, is that there just aren’t that many classic leadoff hitters around. I ran a search for all regulars last season (min. 350 PAs) who had at least a .355 OBP, a 10% walk rate, and an isolated power of less than .180 – thinking that those would be the characteristics of a classic leadoff hitter. Only 12 players fit those criteria, and only three of them actually hit leadoff—Shin-Soo Choo, Matt Carpenter, and Dexter Fowler. Among the others who fit those criteria were players that no team would actually use as a leadoff hitter—Joe Mauer, Billy Butler, Prince Fielder, Buster Posey, Aramis Ramirez, and Chris Ianetta. There were also a few players who weren’t being used as leadoff hitter, but would fit the role pretty well—Jason Kipnis, Dustin Pedroia, and Andre Ethier. But the fact is, most teams are not going to be able to find a classic leadoff hitter because those skills are exceedingly rare. Both Werth and Harper are pretty good at getting on base and at drawing walks, so I think it would make sense to use them as leadoff hitters.
The other thing that really stood out in this analysis is that LaRoche has reached the point where he really needs to be platooned. His .339 projected wOBA against right-handers is adequate, but the .308 projected against lefties is horrible. Whether it’s with Zimmerman or Tyler Moore, I hope that Matt Williams will see the need to institute a platoon.
Last season, 11 MLB teams won at least 91 games and made it to some type of playoff, wild card, or tie breaker game. Nine of those teams had a # 2 catcher with an OPS of at least .650; over all 11 teams, the average OPS of the # 2 catcher was .711 in 252 plate appearances. Although there are a lot of weak-hitting backup catchers in Major League Baseball, it is not characteristic of championship teams to have a hole in their lineup when the backup catcher plays.
Before this morning, it looked like the Nats were heading into the season with a gaping hole at their backup catcher slot. The backup catchers on their 40-man roster were Jhonatan Solano and Sandy Leon. Last year, Solano’s OPS was .523 in Triple A and Leon’s was .542 in Double A. Furthermore, their primary catcher, Wilson Ramos, has had several injuries and played only 103 games over the last two seasons. While the Nats had Chris Snyder and Koyie Hill available under minor league contracts, neither of them bring much of a bat either.
With today’s announcement of the trade of Nate Karns for Jose Lobaton and two additional prospects who haven’t been named yet, Mike Rizzo has taken a small step toward filling that hole. Although Lobaton had a .249/.320/.394 line last season, his career line of .228/.311/.343 is probably more indicative of his projected hitting ability. Furthermore, reports of a weak throwing arm and below average ability at framing pitches* leaves me wondering just how much of an upgrade he’ll be over Solano and Leon. Nevertheless, this was the one roster hole that most needed filling, and I’m glad to see Rizzo make this move.
* Update: I notice that there are reports that Rizzo said Lobaton’s ability to frame pitches was a “key” to the Lobaton deal, which would contradict my statement about “below average ability at framing pitches.” So I need to clarify. First, it’s a bit hard to find data on pitch framing, so I hadn’t actually checked his record before writing this; I was just remembering a comment by Harper a couple days ago on Nationals Baseball blog. According to StatCorner, it looks like Lobaton is about average at pitch framing, neither unusually good or bad. I misinterpreted Harper’s point, which was that Lobaton became expendible because he was not nearly as good at pitch framing as the Rays’ Jose Molina, who everyone agrees is one of the best at framing. So I was wrong, but it would also seem hard to defend Rizzo’s comment about pitch framing being a key to the deal.
There is a sense in which Rizzo may be right, that pitch framing mattered. It’s when you look at the bottom of the list, the worst pitch framers. This list includes not only Koyie Hill, whom the Nationals control under a minor league contract, but other free agent catchers that the Nats passed on, such as John Buck. So even though Lobaton’s average pitch framing is what made him expendible by the Rays, it may also have been the key that made him more attractive to Rizzo than Buck.
Nats Noodles 