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September 9, 2013 / Nat Anacostia

The shutdown in retrospect

Saturday marked the anniversary of the shutdown of Stephen Strasburg. Like many Nats fans, I was taken aback at how his impending shutdown seemed to dominate the sports channels during the last weeks of summer last year; how broadcasters and sportswriters seemed to think that if they kept arguing with enough vehemence, Mike Rizzo would recognize the errors of his ways and reverse course.

Of course, the shutdown went forward as had been planned for many months, and the Nats went on to lose the division championship series. Now that some time has passed, how do the arguments stand up?

There’s a sense in which both sides have won.

It’s impossible, of course, to demonstrate that the shutdown may have saved Strasburg’s arm. If anything, he’s pitching more poorly this season. Nevertheless, the Nats’ decision to limit the innings of a young pitcher coming off Tommy John surgery continues to be the norm in baseball. If Rizzo had ignored the norm and allowed Strasburg to pitch more innings, and Strasburg were subsequently injured, the outcry would have been deafening. Rizzo, rather than pushing the envelope, was merely reflecting the current consensus on handling recovery from Tommy John surgery.

Furthermore, as Nats fans have frequently pointed out, the shutdown had no effect on the NLDS outcome. Absent the shutdown, Strasburg would have pitched one game, and Ross Detwiler would not have started. Detwiler pitched brilliantly in his one game and the Nats won. Absent some creative fiction, it’s hard to argue that Strasburg’s absence from the rotation had any impact on the outcome of the series. Of course, one shouldn’t evaluate decisions made in uncertainty based on the actual outcomes, but the actual outcome does illustrate analysis that suggested that any single player was unlikely to change the outcome of a short series.

The last year has also demonstrated that the critics of the shutdown were right about one really big issue—you can’t take post-season opportunities for granted. A year ago, most Nats fans were convinced that the team had become a dynasty and would have many post-season opportunities. At this point, we see that teams that look good on paper at the beginning of the season don’t always deliver. A team shouldn’t let it’s post-season chances go to waste.

This leads to another argument that deserves more attention—the Nats shouldn’t have been so inflexible in their planning. There are ways to keep to an innings limit without making a player ineligible for the post-season, but Rizzo was set on his plan and didn’t want to consider any alternatives. Kris Medlen had his Tommy John surgery at almost the same time as Strasburg, but he was able to start the wild card game for the Braves because he spent the first half of the season as a reliever. My own favorite alternative approach would have been to have Strasburg start once a week—an approach that was later endorsed by sabermetrician Tangotiger.  Someday I expect to see most outstanding young pitchers who are on innings limits, whether due to surgery or simply to build up arm strength, to be placed on a Saturday-only schedule as suggested by Tango.

Thinking about the shutdown makes me think about how inconsistently the Nationals have been about investing in players’ long term health. The Nats’ other franchise player, Bryce Harper, is a case study. His second season has been seriously derailed because they never fully recognized that he was seriously injured when he crashed into a couple of walls, and have rushed him back into service rather than giving him time to fully recover. There seems to be an incongruity between the protectiveness applied to the team’s franchise pitcher and the seeming nonchalance about serious injuries to their franchise position player.

The team is also guilty of some serious pitcher abuse in the case of Ross Ohlendorf. Asked to start in the second game of a doubleheader against the Mets on July  26, facing Mets ace Matt Harvey, Ohlendorf pitched brilliantly, allowing 6 hits and 1 run over 7 innings. By the seventh inning, however, it was obvious that he was out of gas, but Davey didn’t have anyone warming up in the bullpen and had Ohlendorf work his way out of trouble. He did, and the Nationals went on to win with a ninth inning walk-off homer from Ryan Zimmerman. But Ohlendorf hasn’t been the same pitcher since. He had to go on the 15-day disabled list, and in 5 games since the Mets game, he has a 6.32 ERA in 15-2/3 innings. (In contrast, his ERA in his first 9 games through the Mets game was 1.87 in 33-2/3 innings.)

So while I appreciate the commitment to players’ health demonstrated by last season’s innings limits for Strasburg, I wish the principle were applied more consistently, and flexibly, to all of the players on the team.

September 1, 2013 / Nat Anacostia

Nats’ August in review: We’re in a pennant drive, not a salary drive

The Nationals entered the month 4 games below .500, 11 games back of the Braves, and 7-1/2 games behind the Reds in the wild card race.  Another month of playing near .500 ball would have removed any post-season hopes. After a lackluster start, they finally kicked things up toward the end of the month, winning 8 of their last 11 and ended the month with a 16–11 record. They finished the month 15 games behind the Braves, with the divisional race far out of reach, but maintained pace with the Reds for the wild card, 7-1/2 games behind. According to coolstandings.com, the Nats’ odds of  making the wild card fell to 2.9%, but facing a generally weak schedule, the team remained hopeful of making a final month surge accompanied by a collapse by their opponent.

As the months began, the Nats were finishing a road trip against the Brewers, and beat them two games to one. They returned home to face the Braves, needing to sweep the series to retain any sliver of hope in the divisional race. Instead, the Braves swept them, winning the first two games by one run apiece, and setting the Nats’ divisional aspirations out of reach for this season.

Series with the Braves and Giants followed, and things started to look up when the Nats swept the Phillies. They were one out away from sweeping the Giants as well, but Rafael Sorano gave up a two-run lead in the final inning of the last Giants game.

The next road trip began against the Braves, and it was a strange series. The Braves won the first game 3–2, and Bryce Harper was twice hit by a pitch, which came on top of another apparently intentional plunking during the previous Braves series in Washington. Stephen Strasburg, protecting his teammate, drilled Justin Upton in the first inning of the next game, and the score appeared to be settled. But in the second inning, his control unraveled and he was ejected after twice pitching behind Adrelton Simmons.  The game went on to extra innings and the Nats finally won, 8–7, in the 15th inning after an Adam LaRoche home run. The extra-inning effort appeared to have sapped their energy, though, as the Nats lost their final game against the Braves and were blown out in the first of a four-game series against the Cubs. They  then regrouped and won the next three games, as well as the first two of three against the Royals, losing the final game.

Returning home, the Nats faced the Marlins and the Mets. They swept the Marlins, but ended the month with two losses against the Mets.

Where did the Nats improve? For the first time this season, the Nats’ batting was above average. Their wRC+ for the month was 116, tops in the National League. Starting pitching was also pretty good, with a 3.67 ERA for the month ranking fifth in the league. But relief pitching was a weakness, with their relievers’ ERA of 3.99 ranking 11th in the league.

Record:

16–11 (.593)

Pythagorean Record:

16–11 (4.74 R/G – 4.04 RA/G)

MVP for August:

Jayson Werth (.380/.468/.620, 26 G, 109 PA, 6 HR, 20 R, 21 RBI, 1.4 fWAR, 1.63 WPA, 13.50 RE24).

Most valuable pitcher:

Stephen Strasburg (1–0, 2.60 R/9, 5 G, 27-2/3 IP, 9.8 K/9, 2.3 BB/9, 4.54 RE24, 0.8 rWAR).

Most valuable reliever:

Tanner Roark (4-0, 1.59 R/9, 9 G, 22-2/3 IP, 7.5 K/9, 2.8 BB/9, 5.6 H/9, 5.03 RE24, 0.58 WPA, 5 shutdowns, 1 meltdown).

Worst month:

Ryan Mattheus (0–1, 11.05 R/9, –5.09 RE24, 9 G, 7-1/3 IP, 15 H, 1 HR, 4 BB, 56.8% LOB%, 1 shutdown, 3 meltdowns). A short trip to Syracuse didn’t help Mattheus, as he seemed just as lost when he returned.

Best start this month:

Stephen Strasburg (August 11, 6–0 win over the Phillies at home). Strasburg pitched a shutout—his first career complete game—and gave up 4 hits , 1 walk, and got 10 K with a game score of 88 for the best start of his career according to game score.

Worst start:

Gio Gonzalez (August 23, 11–10 win over the Royals in Kansas City). Gonzalez lasted 3-1/3 innings and gave up 10 hits, 7 runs, 3 walks, and 2 home runs, while getting only 1 K with a game score of 10.

Tough losses:

Gio Gonzalez (August 18, 2–1 loss to the Braves) gave up 2 runs on 5 hits and 4 walks, while striking out 9, in 7 innings (game score 64). Gio Gonzalez (August 6, 2–1 loss to the Braves) gave up two runs on 6 hits and 1 walk, striking out 5, in 7 innings (game score 61). Jordan Zimmermann (August 24, 7–2 loss to the Royals) gave up 3 runs on 6 hits (1 HR) and 1 walk, striking out 6 in 7-2/3 innings (game score 60).

Cheap win:

None.

Best shutdown:

Craig Stammen (August 17, 8–7 win over the Braves in Atlanta). He pitched 3 scoreless innings (innings 12 through 14) in a 7–7 tie, giving up no hits and 1 walk. He got the win after Adam LaRoche hit a home run in the top of the 15th and Dan Haren came in for the save. (Win probability added .390).

Worst meltdown:

Rafael Soriano (August 15, 4–3 loss to the Giants at home) entered in the top of the 9th with a 3–1 lead. He gave up a leadoff single to Buster Posey, then with two outs walked Roger Kieschnick. Facing the Giant’s backup catcher, Hector Sanchez, as a pinch hitter, Soriano gave up a 3-run home run and the lead. The Nats were unable to score in the bottom of the ninth and lost a game that they should have won. (Win probability added –.749)

Clutch hit:

Scott Hairston (August 21, 11–6 win over the Cubs in Chicago). With the score tied 6–6, in the top of the seventh, Bryce Harper hit a 2-out double and the Cubs intentionally walked Jayson Werth to get to Hairston. Hairston responded with a 3-run blast, putting the Nats ahead 9–6. (WPA .398)

Choke:

Scott Hairston (August 5, 3–2 loss to the Braves at home) came in as a pinch hitter with runners on second and third and one out in the bottom of the ninth, trailing the Braves 3–2. With Kimbrel unavailable, Jordan Walden was on the mound. Hairston fouled out to the catcher and was unable to drive in a run (WPA –.247). Chad Tracy followed with a game-ending fly ball out.


														
August 20, 2013 / Nat Anacostia

Nats’ performance versus expectations at the 75% mark

On Saturday, the Nationals completed their 122nd game, marking 75% of their scheduled games this season. At the 25% mark and after the All-Star break, I posted evaluations of the Nats players, comparing them to what was expected at the beginning of the season. This post marks the third in this series.

Over the last month, several player’s positions have changed. Jayson Werth has gone on an incredibly hot streak, earning Player of the Month honors for July and as of this writing, looking like a candidate for repeat honors in August. Dan Haren has taken some big steps toward rehabilitating his reputation. On the other hand, Rafael Soriano’s stock has dropped, and the Jordan Zimmermann’s luster has dimmed.

A brief summary of my methodology. The projections come from a series of pre-season positional power rankings that were published by fangraphs.com. I’ve pro-rated those projections to 122 games. For position players, the tables below show the projections for plate appearances (PA), weighted on-base average (wOBA), and wins above replacement (WAR), followed by the actual data through Saturday night’s game. I also show Projected minus Actual for each position (thus providing a combined evaluation when two or more players have shared a position, such as Danny Espinosa and Anthony Rendon). For pitchers, the data are for innings pitched (IP), ERA, fielding-independent pitching (FIP), and WAR.

You can examine the tables below. I thought I’d discuss these results by contrasting them with a recent article by Bill Baer that appeared at ESPN’s Sweetspot blog entitled “Where did the Nationals go wrong?” Here are Baer’s comments, followed by comments based on my findings.

Gio Gonzalez regressed.  First, I’ll note that Baer and I are actually making somewhat different comparisons, since he’s comparing this year’s performance to last year’s, whereas I’m comparing it to a projection that already takes account of normal regression. Yes, Gio Gonzalez regressed. But I’m actually much more concerned about Stephen Strasburg, who appears to have not only regressed, but to have declined, especially in his control and strikeout rates. I find Gonzalez’s performance to be about 0.85 wins below expectations, but Strasburg’s to be about 1.65 wins below expectations. Furthermore, Gonzalez’s deficit seems more likely to be luck, since it’s largely reflected in an increase in his home run rate. Yet Strasburg’s decline seems to be receiving remarkably little attention from the Nats writers that I follow.

Shaky back of the rotation. Baer focused on both Dan Haren and Ross Detwiler, but really the dropoff is almost entirely Haren (with Detwiler’s normal regression being something that should have been anticipated.) On the other hand, Haren has improved since he returned from the DL on July 8, and Taylor Jordan was a pleasant surprise.

Worse middle relief. Actually, the main drop-off in relief came from Drew Storen, who was projected to be the setup man. It’s true that there have been some disappointments among the middle relievers (Zach Duke, Ryan Mattheus), but there have also been some pleasant surprises (Ross Ohlendorf, Tanner Roark). My numbers suggest that, with the exception of Storen, the good news among the middle relievers has actually outweighed the bad.

Adam LaRoche regressed, Yes, Adam LaRoche, who was expected to regress after a career year, has turned in a severely disappointing season. His wOBA of .321 is very disappointing for a first baseman, and his contract now looks like a mistake. On the other hand, Baer doesn’t mention Ryan Zimmerman, whose 2.0 win drop-off is even more severe than LaRoche’s 1.5 win decline. Zimmerman’s decline may be overlooked when focusing on hitting statistics, but his decline in fielding is obvious when you watch the games. Also, Baer doesn’t mention Danny Espinosa’s sharp drop-off. While Anthony Rendon has filled in admirably and has been an even better hitter than Espinosa’s projected hitting line, Rendon hasn’t matched Espy’s abilities with the glove (though he’s learning).

Denard Span has been a flop. Ok, Denard Span hasn’t met expectations, but I think he’s become somewhat of a scapegoat. Based on what Span did over the prior three seasons, no one should have expected him to be an above average hitter, and he was probably miscast as the new lead-off man. But Span has excelled in the field, and his differential between Projected and Actual of 0.8 wins is smaller than those for Espinosa, Zimmerman, LaRoche, or Kurt Suzuki, and is about the same as Bryce Harper’s differential. He’s been one of the better contributors on the team, better than most of the other regular center fielders in the National League, and people really should quit dumping on him. I don’t regard him as one of the Nationals’ bigger problems.

Then there’s the really big thing that Baer didn’t mention in his article—the Nats’ bench has been awful. Between Tyler Moore, Chad Tracy, Roger Bernadina, and Steve Lombardozzi, the Nats’ bench has been –3.0 wins, or 4 wins below expectations. That’s a remarkable result for a group of players who don’t play regularly, and continues to be the biggest single contributor to the Nats’ failure this season.

I guess I’ll end this discussion on a more positive note. Two players have stepped forward this season and substantially exceeded expectations—Ian Desmond and Jayson Werth. Amidst all the despair about Strasburg, LaRoche, and Zimmerman, it’s good to see some big steps forward from a couple of our key players.

Position Players

Pos Player PA (proj) wOBA (p) WAR (p) PA (act) wOBA (a) WAR (a) Proj–Act
C Kurt Suzuki 279 .298 1.3 272 .258 0.2 1.1
  Wilson Ramos 173 .313 1.1 163 .346 1.1  
1B Adam LaRoche 474 .337 1.8 454 .321 0.3 1.5
2B Danny Espinosa 517 .308 2.2 167 .206 –0.6 2.0
  Anthony Rendon 26 .309 0.1 277 .320 0.9  
3B Ryan Zimmerman 448 .354 3.2 461 .340 1.2 2.0
SS Ian Desmond 448 .323 2.5 497 .346 4.1 –1.6
LF Bryce Harper 474 .350 2.9 348 .371 2.1 0.8
CF Denard Span 448 .308 2.1 499 .295 1.3 0.8
RF Jayson Werth 474 .337 1.7 367 .409 2.9 –1.2
Bench Roger Bernadina 105 .309 0.4 167 .233 –0.2 4.0
  Tyler Moore 79 .315 0.1 117 .215 –1.4  
  Steve Lombardozzi 169 .299 0.5 234 .257 –0.7  
  Chad Tracy 26 .303 0 109 .224 –0.7  

Pitchers

Role Player IP (proj) ERA (p) FIP (p) WAR (p) IP (act) ERA (a) FIP (a) WAR* (a) Proj–Act
SP-1 Stephen Strasburg 144.0 2.69 2.61 4.3 147.3 2.93 3.22 2.65 1.65
SP-2 Gio Gonzalez 152.0 3.22 3.24 3.2 144.7 3.42 3.50 2.35 0.85
SP-3 Jordan Zimmermann 131.7 3.54 3.60 2.3 158.0 3.02 3.39 3.00 –0.70
SP-4 Dan Haren 124.3 3.66 3.53 2.2 126.0 4.79 4.26 0.45 1.75
SP-5 Ross Detwiler 97.0 4.13 4.02 1.1 71.3 4.04 3.66 0.60 0.65
  Taylor Jordan         51.7 3.66 3.49 0.45  
  Nate Karns         12.0 7.50 8.37 –0.40  
  Other Starters 44.3     0.2          
RP-1 Rafael Soriano 49.0 3.28 3.50 0.6 51.3 3.68 3.84 0.30 0.30
RP-2 Drew Storen 49.0 3.16 3.30 0.8 44.3 5.68 3.88 –0.65 1.45
RP-3 Tyler Clippard 41.3 3.05 3.51 0.4 54.3 2.15 3.98 0.85 –0.45
RP-4 Craig Stammen 41.3 3.28 3.58 0.3 65.7 3.15 2.83 0.65 –0.35
RP-5+ Other Relievers 232.0     0.0 164.0     0.95 –0.95

For pitcher’s actual WAR*, I used an average of two WAR-type measures presented on the fangraphs site—their main WAR based on fielding independent pitching, and another version that’s based on runs allowed called RA9-WAR. Both metrics seem useful for evaluating pitcher performance, so I decided to use the average.

August 19, 2013 / Nat Anacostia

David DeJesus? Huh?

This afternoon the Nats announced that they had acquired outfielder David DeJesus from the Chicago Cubs and had released Roger Bernadina. 

Many Nats fans are undoubtedly wondering why this move was made. Yes, Bernadina has been an awful hitter this season, with no signs of coming out of his slump. And DeJesus is a pretty good acquisition, especially as a fourth outfielder—a league average hitter and fielder who can play all three positions.

But why now, when the odds of making the wild-card play-in game are so minuscule? This is the kind of move that should have been made six or seven weeks ago when it could have moved the team’s playoff odds.

Maybe Mike Rizzo is simply tardy, but the other possibility is that this deal is mostly about the option year. DeJesus’s contract includes a $6.5 million team option for 2014. Maybe Rizzo has convinced the Lerner’s that they need to spend some real money on the bench next year to avoid a repeat of this season’s bench debacle. $6.5 million is a lot for a fourth outfielder, but it could be less than for an equivalent free agent. Also, a free agent might insist on a two-year deal, whereas Rizzo has been very reluctant to sign marginal players in their 30s to multi-year deals.

I guess in a few weeks we’ll find out if it really is about the option year.

August 8, 2013 / Nat Anacostia

Why were we so wrong about the Nationals?

With the divisional race now out of reach and the wild card drifting farther and farther, writers are turning to the blame game. According to Tom Boswell of the Washington Post, the Nat’s problem is that they don’t execute fundamental baseball:

… another huge Nats problem, and the one that absolutely must be solved before anything really good can happen, is that they play the game badly at the fundamental level night after infuriating night. The Nats think, correctly, that they are talented. But bad baseball always beats talent. The Nats aren’t winning because the way they’ve played, they don’t merit it.

According to Rachel Levitan, writing at MASN’s Nationals Buzz, the team’s problem is lack of passion:

… this is exactly what’s bothering me about this Nats team. Where’s the fire? Where’s the passion?

In both cases, the writer sees the disappointing outcomes not as the result of bad luck, or lack of ability, or poor management, but as a MORAL failure—they don’t merit winning because they haven’t learned and executed the fundamentals or because they aren’t bringing the right attitude. That’s a very common theme in sports writing—sports is a morality play in which winning is the result of moral superiority and losing is the punishment for moral failings.

Fortunately, Harper at Nationals Baseball has demolished Boswell’s argument, showing that the Nats’ failures in the so-called fundamentals are really pretty small in magnitude and have little to do with putting together a winning team. I won’t spend time on Levitan’s argument about passion, except to say that if passion is indeed their problem, we will also see it in their statistics. Instead, I’d like to walk through how I like to look at this from an analytical perspective. A couple of weeks ago, I walked through some of the numbers. This time, I’d like to talk my way through the concepts.

Let’s start with why everyone pre-season was picking the Nationals to dominate the National League this year. I think most people started with the Nationals win-loss record last year—98 wins, the most in baseball—and then started making various additions and subtractions. Stephen Strasburg and Bryce Harper will be available all season. Most of the players are young and are likely to improve. Wilson Ramos will be back. They added Rafael Soriano to the bullpen. All were reasons to add some wins. On the other hand, Adam LaRoche had just had his best season at age 32 and probably wasn’t going to be that good. Several other players, such as Ross Detwiler, Danny Espinosa, and Ian Desmond, hadn’t had sustained success yet, and several might regress. You have to allow for injuries. All of these were reasons to subtract a few wins.

If you approach it that way, a lot of people were guessing that the Nats might win anywhere from 92 to more than 100 games. I’m going to suggest that that wasn’t the best way to approach the problem of projecting performance.

Analysts—especially those who forecast player performance—tend to think of players having an unobservable “true talent” level, which unfortunately is clouded by a lot of statistical noise. In some cases, true talent levels may be exposed relatively quickly. For example, abilities for walking or striking out may be relatively well measured in as few as a couple hundred plate appearances. But other abilities, and in particular, a player’s overall true talent level, may take several years to fully reveal itself. We get fooled all the time—Todd Frazier got some Rookie of the Year votes and sure looked like a great player—Oops! Wait a minute.

The problem is that even while we’re gradually learning about a player’s true talent, their talent is also changing. For a young player, it’s often learning or improvement in skills—Anthony Rendon is learning to turn the double play. But as time goes on, more often the changes in true talent are the effects of injuries or of aging. It can be tough to identify changes in true talent.

So returning to our question, “Why were we so wrong?” there are several possible explanations:

  1. Maybe the 2012 Nats played above their true talent level, leading to faulty expectations.
  2. As we’ve seen more data and learned more about the players this season, we may be learning that their true talent level isn’t as high as we thought a year ago.
  3. Maybe their true talent levels have declined due to injury, aging, or other reasons.
  4. Maybe the 2013 Nats are playing below their true talent level due to bad luck or a myriad of other possible reasons.

Fortunately, their are some numbers available that let us get a sense of how important each of these explanations are. In particular, I particularly find useful a couple of datasets at fangraphs.com. First, there’s their positional power rankings from the beginning of the season. This represents a systematic forecast of each team and player’s performance based on the information that was available pre-season. Although it’s not exactly the same thing as # 1 because of personnel changes between 2012 and 2013, it does give us a pretty good idea of what a systematic, unbiased projection system thought the Nationals true talent levels were at the beginning of this season.  The other resources are their projected standings and team depth charts, which provide an updated version of those projections based on currently available information. In particular, the projected rest of season numbers provide an objective estimate of their current true talent levels.

So which of our four explanations is most important in explaining the disappointment. I think # 1 may actually be most important—we gave too much credit to the 2012 team relative to their true talent. The pre-season positional power rankings indicated that the Nationals were not a 98-win team, but instead were projected for approximately 88 wins. Furthermore, rather than walking away with the NL East, as most analysts were projecting, the fangraphs assessment showed the Nationals neck-and-neck with the Braves. I remember feeling a sense of shock when I first went through those rankings, but as I examined the projections more carefully, I decided that they were actually quite solid and that the Nationals had more holes in their lineup than I had realized.

In particular, that assessment indicated in advance two problem areas that most fans weren’t thinking of. The bullpen, despite the addition of Soriano, was only ranked as mediocore. And although the projections didn’t expose just how dreadful the bench would turn out to be, it did indicate that the bench was not a strength. Both projections were prescient.

On the issue of the bench, Bill James just posted this comment on his “Hey Bill” Q&A page:

One of the key differences between a contending team and a second-division team is that a team like the Red Sox has players coming off the bench, like Jonny Gomes and Mike Carp, who are clearly above replacement level, whereas the bench of a second-division team consists entirely of replacement-level players.

Although no one could have forecast how dreadful the Nats’ bench would be, there clearly were signals that the bench probably wouldn’t be as strong as in 2012. With Mike Rizzo spending some money to try to strengthen the team during the off-season, he really should have spent more time and money on the bench.

Going back to our four explanations for our miss on the Nats’ performance, I guess I would rank the second most important as being that the 2013 team has played below their true talent level. The fangraphs current projected rest-of-season winning percentage for the Nats is .524 (or 85 wins over a full season). I think that’s a rough estimate of their current true talent level, and you can see that it’s only deteriorated a bit from where it was at the beginning of the season. At present, the Nats are 6 games below a .524 winning percentage. This difference between actual performance and true talent could be due to luck, or to any of the other factors like fundamentals that sports writers love to emphasize. It’s certainly within the usual range for luck, though, so we can’t rule out the idea that they’ve simply had some bad luck.

The other two factors, changes in true talent and learning more about players’ true talent, receive the most attention but are probably the least important overall. I’ve already written about some of these issues—for example, in the case of Strasburg, his decline in strikeout rate and increase in walk rate, which are both statistics that stabilize at new levels relatively quickly, seems to be indicative of an actual decline in his talent level. As a Nats fan, I’m quite concerned by this apparent diminution in talent. Other players for whom injuries or aging appear to have resulted in talent declines include Ryan Zimmerman, Danny Espinosa, Drew Storen, and possibly Adam LaRoche.

For many of their other players, however, a comparison of their beginning-of-year and current projections indicate minor adjustments to the estimates of true talent, but maybe not any actual change in those levels. For example, although Gio Gonzalez has given up more home runs this season than last, his strikeout and walk rates have barely budged, and the projections have barely budged as well. The change in home run rates seems to mostly be a matter of luck. In the case of Desmond, even though his performance this season is slightly below last season’s his projected true talent has actually gone up, as the projection now recognizes that his 2012 season was not a fluke and was close to his true talent.

Over the coming weeks, I’ll be writing more about the Nats players as we try to establish the team’s needs for the off season. But I come away from this discussion with the following message. Last season’s team was not as good as it looked at the time, but neither is this season’s team nearly as bad as it may seem. The fangraphs rest-of-season projection actually has the Braves at .525, neck-and-neck with the Nationals. In other words, if we were able to get a reboot on the season, we should be perfectly matched, talent-wise, with our divisional competitor. While that doesn’t let us off the hook for doing something this off-season, it does suggest that the situation is not completely dire and we don’t have to think about a major re-build.

August 5, 2013 / Nat Anacostia

Another season from Strasburg: How has he changed?

Last year, after Stephen Strasburg completed his 33rd career start on June 30, 2012, I wrote a post noting that he had completed the equivalent of a full season and looked at how he’d done. With his last start in Detroit, he’s now at 66 career starts and has completed the equivalent of a second full season, so it seems like an opportune time to see how he’s changed over the last 13 months.

This post will also kick off a series of posts I’d like to do, looking at the team’s key personnel and how they fit into the team’s prospects for 2014 going forward. (I haven’t completely given up on 2013, but I’m realistic enough to recognize that 2014 should now be the team’s most important focus.)

Period W L ERA IP HR BB SO SO/BB FIP IP/G
First 33* 15 7 2.68 185 11 46 238 5.17 2.09 5.6
Second 33** 11 12 3.26 196.2 21 62 209 3.37 3.41 5.9

*  6/8/2010 thru 6/30/2012

** 7/6/2012 thru 7/30/2013

We can see that with the exception of innings pitched, every statistic has declined. In his 33 starts since July 2012, Strasburg has given up more runs, more home runs, and more walks, and has gotten fewer strikeouts than he had in his first 33 starts. If we do those comparisons on a per-batter-faced basis, his home runs increased from 1.50% to 2.60%, his walks increased from 6.26% to 7.67%, and his strikeouts decreased from 32.38% to 25.87%.

In my earlier post, I compared his first-season-equivalent performance with the MLB leaders in 2011. Those comparisons looked pretty good—if his first 33 starts had all been completed during the 2011 season, he would have ranked sixth in the majors in ERA, ninth in fewest home runs allowed (among qualified pitchers), third in strikeouts, fourth in strikeout-to-walk ratio, and first in fielding-independent pitching (FIP).  If we make a similar set of comparisons of his second set of 33 starts to the 2012 MLB leaders, Strasburg’s performance looks much less impressive. If starts 34 through 66 had all occurred during 2012, Strasburg would have ranked 16th in ERA, 40th in fewest home runs allowed, 9th in strikeouts, 28th in strikeout-to-walk ratio, and 19th in FIP.

Over the last 13 months, Strasburg has basically slid from being perhaps one of the top five pitchers in baseball, with comparisons made to Pedro Martinez in his prime, to maybe one of the top 20 or 25. In fact, it’s no longer clear that Strasburg is even the Nats’ best pitcher. It’s funny—when Nats fans and bloggers talk about why the team has disappointed, they talk a lot about Denard Span and how his on-base percentage is maybe 10 points lower than it should be. Span is not the problem the Nats should be worried about. They should be much more worried about Strasburg’s FIP being up 1.3 runs per game, and about Ryan Zimmerman‘s fielding and Adam LaRoche‘s hitting. Those are the problems, along with an incredibly weak bench and a disappointing bullpen and Dan Haren‘s strugges, that have caused the Nats to miss their expectations by so much.

What’s caused Strasburg’s performance to slip? It’s hard to point to any one thing. Turning to the annual data (I didn’t try compiling pitched ball data across the 33 game periods), we see that his fastball velocity, which averaged 97 during 2010 pre-Tommy John surgery, has never regained that level and has continued to slip a bit, down 0.5 mph this season from 95.8 to 95.3. Although the increase in walks and hit-by-pitch suggest control problems, I don’t see a significant decrease in his percent of pitches in the zone. But there is more contact and fewer swinging strikes. Batters seem to be seeing his fastball better and are making better contact with it, which gives him fewer opportunities to turn to his still excellent curveball and change-up.

In putting together a list of players with the highest trade value, Dave Cameron of fangraphs.com recently gave a nice summary of Strasburg’s current status, which I pretty much agree with:

He’s still an excellent pitcher, but it’s been awhile since he looked like the best pitcher on the planet. He might not ever look like that again… It is likely that Stephen Strasburg peaked in 2010, as a rookie.

All that negativity aside, teams would still be lining up out the door if the Nationals made him available. He’s got three years of team control left at arbitration prices, and the low innings totals and lack of sexy win numbers this year will keep his price reasonable. He still throws 95, gets strikeouts and ground balls, and has an ERA of 2.99. He might be worse, but worse than historically amazing isn’t so bad.

Strasburg is both terrific and kind of disappointing at the same time.

It’s really, really tough for a pitcher to maintain elite status year after year. Pitchers can and sometimes do re-gain that status—maybe they pick up a new pitch or make some change in mechanics to improve their command. But most don’t. While we remain hopeful that Strasburg may eventually reach the heights that originally looked possible, the reality may be that we’re looking forward to several seasons of a merely very, very good pitcher, and not an historically great one.

August 1, 2013 / Nat Anacostia

Nats’ July in review: It looks more like a bust

The Nationals entered July one game above .500 and 6-1/2 games back of the Braves, needing a strong, winning month in order to remain relevant for the divisional or wild card races. Instead, they stumbled to their worst month since May 2011, back in the Jim Riggleman era. After an especially brutal 2–11 stretch from July 8 through 24, the team’s chances had faded away, and they stood pat at the trade deadline. The Nats went 11–16 in July and ended the month four games below .500 and 11 games back of the Braves. According to coolstandings.com, the Nats’ odds of winning the division had dropped to a miniscule 0.6%, and their odds of making the wild card fell to 3.6%.

The month actually began on a hopeful note, as Bryce Harper was activated from the disabled list on July 1, and Wilson Ramos on July 4. For the first time in months, the position players were all healthy. A trade for Scott Hairston allowed them to option Tyler Moore to Syracuse. Initially, it looked like it was working, as Harper homered in his first at bat from the DL, and Ramos drove in five runs in his first game back. The Nats split a four-game series with the Brewers, then swept a three-game set against the Padres, finishing a 5–2 home stand and closing their gap with the Braves to four games.

A road trip to Philadelphia and Miami followed, and things began to unravel. Former Nat John Lannan pitched the opener in Philly and outpitched his replacement, Dan Haren, for a 3–2 Phillies win. Ross Detwiler missed his next start and would eventually be moved to the disabled list, with Taylor Jordan taking his place in the rotation and taking a 4–2 loss against Cole Hamels. With Gio Gonzalez pitching the third game, the Nats beat Cliff Lee’s Phillies 5–1. But they lost game four 3–1, despite a good performance from Jordan Zimmermann.  In Miami, things really started falling apart, as Stephen Strasburg lasted only two innings in the worst start of his career. In the next game, Haren pitched well, but Harper got tossed in the 8th inning of a tie game, which was lost in the 10th when his replacement, Hairston, was unable to get a clutch hit. They managed a win in the last game before the All-Star game, but they were 2–5 on a disappointing road trip.

After the break, they returned home to face the Dodgers in three games, the Pirates in four, and the Mets in four. The Dodgers swept a three-game set, despite good pitching performances from Strasburg and Gonzalez (and an abysmal start from Zimmermann). The Pirates won the next three, giving the Nats a 6-game losing streak, before they finally came back in the final game against the Pirates with a walk-off home run by Harper. They next played a day-night doubleheader against the Mets and were crushed 14–1 in the first game. In the nightcap, however, Ross Ohlendorf made a spot start and was excellent, keeping the game tied against Matt Harvey. Ryan Zimmerman won the game with a walk-off homer in the ninth. The next day, Haren pitched well in a 4–1 win, and in the final game, Jordan got his first major league win as the bats finally came alive in a 14–1 rout.

The month ended with a road trip and two games against Detroit. Although the Nats had Strasburg and Gonzalez pitching, they were clobbered in both games, 5–1 in Strasburg’s start and 11–1 in Gonzalez’s.

Where did the Nats go wrong? Basically everywhere. In batting (measured by wRC+) their index for July was 95, ranking 8th in the National League. Starting pitching, which had supported the weak bats in previous months, was even worse. The starters had a 4.53 ERA in July, ranking 11th in the NL. And the relievers’ ERA was 4.24, 13th in the league.  Even their fielding was bad, with the Nats ranking 13th in the measure of fielding runs calculated by fangraphs.com. It was a truly dismal month.

Record:

11–16 (.407)

Pythagorean Record:

11–16 (3.93 R/G – 4.59 RA/G)

MVP for July:

Jayson Werth (.371/.448/.629, 26 G, 105 PA, 7 HR, 17 R, 21 RBI, 1.3 fWAR, 0.11 WPA, 10.15 RE24).

Most valuable pitcher:

Wow. Until the last day of the month. Gio Gonzalez had this award locked up, but now, I don’t know—I guess I’ll go with Dan Haren (1–2, 3.13 R/9, 4 G, 23 IP, 10.2 K/9, 2.3 BB/9, 2.56 RE24, 0.5 rWAR).

Most valuable reliever:

Tyler Clippard (0–0, 0.00 R/9, 13 G, 13 IP, 11.1 K/9, 2.1 BB/9, 1.4 H/9, 5.95 RE24, 0.87 WPA, 6 shutdowns, 0 meltdown).

Worst month:

Drew Storen (1–1, 13.03 R/9, –8.06 RE24, 12 G, 9-2/3 IP, 15 H, 3 HR, 4 BB, 33.8% LOB%, 4 shutdowns, 4 meltdowns). After a series of notable meltdowns, Storen was optioned to Syracuse on July 27. Dishonorable mention also goes to Adam LaRoche (.163/.236/.288) and Jordan Zimmermann (1–3, 7.18 R/9), who’ve been just awful this month.

Best start this month:

Stephen Strasburg (July 24, 4–2 loss to the Pirates at home). Strasburg pitched 8 innings, gave up 2 hits , no walks, and one run (on a solo home run), and got 12 K with a game score of 86—the best start of his career according to game score. Yet he left with the Nats trailing 1–0, and the bullpen (Storen and Fernando Abad) gave up three more runs in the top of the ninth. Though the Nats’ batters rallied with two runs in the bottom of the ninth, it wasn’t enough, and Strasburg was charged with the loss.

Worst start:

Gio Gonzalez (July 31, 11–1 loss to the Tigers in Detroit). Gonzalez lasted 3-1/3 innings and gave up 11 hits, 10 runs, 1 walk, and 2 home runs, while getting only 3 K with a game score of 0. There was lots of competition for this one though, with Stephen Strasburg and Jordan Zimmermann each pitching the worst game of their careers. Strasburg’s was a 8–3 loss against the Marlins on July 12 (2 innings, 7 runs, game score of 16), and Zimmermann’s was a 9–2 loss to the Dodgers on July 21 (2 innings, 7 runs, game score of 11) could have won this category in most other months.

Tough loss:

Stephen Strasburg (July 24, 4–2 loss to the Pirates—see “Best start this month” above).

Cheap win:

Jordan Zimmerman (July 1, 10–5 win over the Brewers at home). Zimmermann pitched 6 innings and gave up 9 hits, 4 runs, and 2 home runs, while getting 5 K with a game score of 43.

Best shutdown:

Rafael Soriano (July 6, 5–4 win over the Padres at home). This was Soriano’s only one-run save this month. Although he allowed a pair of one-out singles, he followed them with two ground outs to get the save. (Win probability added .152).

Worst meltdown:

Drew Storen (July 2, 4–0 loss to the Brewers at home) entered in the top of the 8th in a 0–0 tie. He gave up a single, a stolen base, a pair of doubles, and another single, giving up 4 runs before getting the third out. (Win probability added –.464)

Clutch hit:

Bryce Harper (July 25, 9–7 win over the Pirates at home). With the score tied 7–7, Roger Bernadina at first, and two outs in the bottom of the 9th, Harper hit his first career walk-off home run. (WPA .440)

Choke:

Scott Hairston (July 13, 2–1 loss to the Marlins in Miami) came in to replace Bryce Harper, who was ejected in the 8th inning for arguing balls and strikes. Hairston came to bat in the top of the 10th with the score tied 1–1, runners on second and third, and one out. He struck out (WPA –.209). Zimmerman followed with another strikeout for the third out. In the bottom of the inning, Craig Stammen came in,  Chad Tracy made an error to let the winning run get on base, and Stammen gave up the winning run.

July 21, 2013 / Nat Anacostia

Time to be realistic – No deadline deal this year

The Nats got swept by the Dodgers in two cliffhangers followed by a rout. They’ve slipped to two games below .500, and though they didn’t lose too much ground to the Braves who were 1–2 this weekend, the Nats are losing ground when they should be making it up.

There is still talk about the Nats making a deadline deal, perhaps for a starting pitcher. But with the Nats’ odds of winning the division now having slipped to about 4%, and of making the wildcard to about 7%, it’s time to concede that this probably isn’t the Nationals year. I’m not saying the team should give up – the odds say every couple of years one team makes up this much ground, and the Nats could be the lucky ones. But trading valuable prospects in a deadline deal usually doesn’t make sense unless the teams odds of making the post-season are at least 25%, in order for the deal to give the team’s odds a reasonable boost.

Now, it still could make sense to make a trade if it’s to fill a hole and the talent is cheaply available. The Scott Hairston deal made sense, and exchanging a C-grade prospect for some starting pitching depth might make sense. But giving up highly rated prospects in a dubious stab at making the post-season doesn’t make sense.

On the other hand, the Nats still have a chance, so they shouldn’t be sellers either. They really aren’t situated to be sellers anyway, with most of their players either in their prime or, for their older players, loaded down with expensive long-term contracts that make them relatively unattractive trade objects. About the only deal I can see is the possibility of trading away one of the relievers, as the bullpen is starting to get crowded with Ryan Mattheus due to return. But several of the relievers still have options, so it may make more sense to move one of them to Syracuse instead.

I continue to wish the team well, but I think we’re kidding ourselves if we think we’re just one starting pitcher away from a successful season.

July 20, 2013 / Nat Anacostia

Nationals’ best deadline deal was the one they didn’t make

With trade season upon us, I’ve seen a couple of posts about the team’s best deadline deal ever. I’m going to remind us that maybe the best deal was the one they didn’t make.

In July of 2006, Alfonso Soriano was headed into free agency and was having a career year. By the All-Star break, he’d hit 27 home runs and was hitting .272 with 56 RBIs, 63 runs scored, and 20 stolen bases. As a free agent, everyone knew that he would command an expensive multi-year contract and that the Nationals weren’t going to try to retain him. The rumors were flying fast and furious as the trade deadline approached.

And then… nothing happened. Soriano wasn’t traded. He stayed in Washington and finished even better in the second half, completing a 40-40 season. The Nationals lost 91 games.

Of course, the fans were in shock. How could Jim Bowden fail to cash in Soriano when his value was at its peak? “Incompetence!” the masses howled.

But by trading Soriano, the Nationals would be giving up two compensatory draft picks. They decided that the cost was too high, relative to what was being offered. And how did those draft picks work out? The first one went for Josh Smoker—didn’t work out so well. But the second was used to pick a pitcher from Division III Wisconsin-Stevens Point. That pitcher, Jordan Zimmermann, has worked out very well indeed. He’s been the most reliable and valuable pitcher during the Nats’ time in Washington.

Of course, without knowing what deals Bowden turned down, we really can’t know that the draft picks were better than the alternative. But if the offer that he turned down was Kevin Slowey, as one story has it, then waiting for the draft to get Zimmermann was far more valuable than the trade.

Of course all draft picks (as well as trades for prospects) involve an element of luck, so we shouldn’t give too much credit to Bowden. But in terms of impact on the organization, the trade we didn’t make may have been the best one of all.

July 18, 2013 / Nat Anacostia

The Nats haven’t met expectations. Who’s at fault?

The Nats haven’t met expectations. A lot of blame is going around. I’m going to try to systematically answer the question: which players are most to blame for performing below what was expected?

To answer this question, we have to step back and ask what was expected. I’m not trying to rank players by their performance, but rather by how much their performance has fallen below (or exceeded) what was expected. To explain what I mean, consider Stephen Strasburg and Ross DetwilerThere’s no question that Strasburg has been a much better pitcher than Detwiler. But despite being one of the better pitchers in the league, an awful lot was expected of Strasburg, who was expected to be one of the top five pitchers in baseball. Not nearly as much was expected of Detwiler. Thus, even though Strasburg has performed much better than Detwiler, I’m going to demonstrate that Strasburg has fallen below his expectations by a greater margin than Detwiler. Thus, the slide in Strasburg’s performance relative to what was expected has been more important in explaining the Nats’ mediocore performance than has Detwiler’s.

To do this analysis, we need a benchmark of what was expected. Fortunately, such a record exists—the Fangraphs 2013 positional power rankings. I analyzed these in an earlier post when we were about one-fourth of the way through the season. Now, with the season 59% over, we have an even clearer picture. I simply prorated each player’s projected wins above replacement (WAR) to 59% of the season, then compared their actual versus projected. (For pitchers, I’m going to use a 50/50 mix of Fangraphs WAR, which is based on fielding independent performance, and another measure called RA9-WAR, which is based on actual runs allowed.

I’ll list the players whose performances are more than 0.5 wins different from their projections, ranked from worst to best, based on the differences between their actual and projected WAR.

Danny Espinosa: –2.3 wins

Projected wOBA, WAR: .308, 1.7

Actual wOBA, WAR: .205, –0.6

A sad story, really. His awful performance was probably due to undiagnosed or untreated injuries. I think he’ll make it back to the majors when he’s recovered, though it remains to be seen whether that happens with the Nationals or another team.

Dan Haren: –2.0 wins

Projected ERA, WAR: 3.66, 1.7

Actual ERA, WAR*:  5.61, –0.3

Are Haren’s troubles over now? Or are the Nationals just getting teased with a temporary respite that prevents them from trading for a suitable replacement before the waiver deadline? I wish I knew.

* “WAR” for pitchers is based on average of Fangraphs “WAR” and “RA9-WAR”

Stephen Strasburg: –1.6 wins

Projected ERA, WAR: 2.69, 3.3

Actual ERA, WAR: 2.99, 1.7

It’s odd that in the discussions of the Nats’ poor performance, Strasburg’s name seldom comes up. Yet, he clearly has not lived up to expectations. The ERA numbers are actually a bit deceptive. His runs allowed per nine innings (R/9), which includes unearned runs for which he bears substantial responsibility, is a much higher 3.74.

Tyler Moore: –1.5 wins

Projected wOBA, WAR:  .315, 0.1

Actual wOBA, WAR: .206, –1.4

It was amazing to me that Davey Johnson and Mike Rizzo let the Tyler Moore fiasco go on for as long as it lasted. How could they give 113 plate appearances to a batter that the league had clearly figured out, and who had no redeeming defensive or other skills?

Adam LaRoche: –1.3 wins

Projected wOBA, WAR: .337, 1.4

Actual wOBA, WAR: .327, 0.1

This differential is a little hard to dissect. His batting is 10 points (wOBA) below expectations, which might account for 3 or 4 runs. Fangraphs also seems to think his fielding has been about 7 runs below expectations (–4.7 versus expected +2.6). I’m not necessarily convinced that LaRoche’s fielding has slipped that much, so I’ll take this rating with a pinch of salt.

Ryan Zimmerman: –1.3 wins

Projected wOBA, WAR: .354, 2.5

Actual wOBA, WAR: .349, 1.2

Zimmerman is sort of a unique case, in that his offense has been fine, very close to expectations. It’s his fielding (10.2 runs below the average third baseman, according to Fangraphs) that is causing his ranking to suffer. The fielding metrics used for WAR are not always accurate, but in this case I really can’t disagree with Fangraphs. His fielding has often been simply excruciating to watch. It’s gotten so bad that the reporters are now praising him every time he successfully makes a routine play. While I don’t expect him to leave third base this year, I think Davey should consider moving Anthony Rendon over to third as a defensive replacement in late innings of tight games.

Steve Lombardozzi: –1.3 wins

Projected wOBA, WAR: .299, 0.4

Actual wOBA, WAR: .235, –0.9

Yes, every team needs a defense-first utility infielder, but their offense can’t be this bad.

Drew Storen: –0.95 wins

Projected ERA, WAR: 3.16, 0.6

Actual ERA, WAR: 4.81, –0.35

Storen’s main problem has been the home runs—0.8 HR/9 projected versus 1.4 HR/9 allowed. I know that there’s an argument that this is just luck and his luck will turn, but Davey is becoming increasingly hesitant to use him in high leverage situations, which makes his future in the bullpen uncertain. He could become a trade chip.

Kurt Suzuki: –0.7 wins

Projected wOBA, WAR: .298, 1.0

Actual wOBA, WAR: .262, 0.3

I suspect that some of his drop-off was simply due to overuse while Ramos was out. It’s tough for a catcher to play almost every day, but unfortunately the Nats no longer have the depth they need at this position.

Bryce Harper: –0.7 wins

Projected wOBA, WAR: .350, 2.3

Actual wOBA, WAR: ..381, 1.6

In Bryce’s case, the main problem has been the playing time he missed due to injury. While active, he’s hit better than expected. I thought he should have been given time off immediately after each of the wall incidents, which might have helped him avoid aggravating the knee while trying to play through it.

Chad Tracy: –0.7 wins

Projected wOBA, WAR: .303, 0.0

Actual wOBA, WAR: .214, –0.7

The only thing preventing Tracy from showing up as poorly as Moore and Lombardozzi has been the limited playing time.

To quickly run through the differentials of the players with differentials of 0.5 wins or less, we have Jayson Werth (–0.5) due to playing time, Denard Span (–0.4), who’s been batting a little below expectations, but I think has been unfairly treated as a scapegoat by many Nats fans, Roger Bernadina (–0.3) whose poor bat has been partly offset by a good glove, and Jhonatan Solano (–0.3). Among the pitchers, there’s Gio Gonzalez (–0.3), Ross Detwiler (–0.3), Craig Stammen (+0.05) and Rafael Soriano (+0.4).

Now, turning to the positive surprises—the players at least 0.5 wins above expectations. This, unfortunately, is a much shorter list:

Tyler Clippard: +0.55

Projected ERA, WAR: 3.05, 0.3

Actual ERA, WAR: 1.99, 0.85

Clip continues to be a remarkable relief pitcher. He’s definitely changed his approach over the last three seasons, but he continues to figure out ways to keep batters guessing and get them out.

Anthony Rendon: +1.0

Projected wOBA, WAR: .309, 0.1

Actual wOBA, WAR: .354, 1.1

He’s new enough that I’m hesitant to declare victory, but I’m certainly encouraged to think that Rendon will be a major contributor to a good Nationals infield for years to come.

Jordan Zimmermann: +1.4

Projected ERA, WAR: 3.54, 1.8

Actual ERA, WAR: 2.58, 3.2

What a great development his year has been. His control, represented by 1.2 BB/9, and his ability to keep the ball in the ballpark have driven an excellent season. While I expect his ERA to inch up, I still expect it to stay below 3.00 for the remainder of the season.

Ian Desmond: +1.6

Projected wOBA, WAR: .323, 1.9

Actual wOBA, WAR: .349, 3.5

He’s become a centerpiece of the lineup, as well as one of our few remaining above-average defensive players. He’s become really central to the team. I’d like to see Desmond’s contract extended and have him made the team captain.