Seventy years ago yesterday, October 5, 1943, the Washington Homestead Grays won the Negro World Series, the first of three World Series championships that they would win over a six-season span.
The Homestead Grays were the dominant team of the Negro National League (the eastern league), having won six of the last seven league championships. The team featured five future Hall of Famers—left fielder and leadoff hitter Cool Papa Bell, first baseman Buck Leonard hitting third, catcher Josh Gibson hitting cleanup, third baseman Jud Wilson, and pitcher Ray Brown. Rounding out their regular roster were Sam Bankhead at shortstop, Howard Easterling at second base, Jerry Benjamin in center field, Vic Harris in right field, and pitchers Johnny Wright and Roy Partlow. While the Grays were loaded with stars, it should be noted that most of the players on their 1943 roster were old. Wilson was 47 years old, Bell was 40, Harris was 38, Leonard and Brown were both 35, and Bankhead was 32. Only 31-year old Gibson and 26-year old Wright could be considered to have been in their prime. Of course, it was the middle of the World War II and many of the younger players had been drafted.
The Grays, originally from Pittsburgh, had begun playing about half their home games at Griffith Stadium in Washington in 1940. After an especially successful season in 1942, in which they lost the World Series to the Kansas City Monarchs, they adopted Washington as their primary home and played the 1943 season as the Washington Homestead Grays. The Negro National League played a split season format, but because the Grays won both halves of the season, no playoff series was needed.
Their opponents were the Birmingham Black Barons, champions of the western Negro American League. The Black Barons’ roster did not include Hall of Famers, but it was a talented team that would win consecutive pennants. Prominent players for the Black Barons included shortstop Piper Davis, second baseman Tommy Sampson, right fielder Clyde Spearman, and catcher Ted (Double Duty) Radcliffe. Birmingham won the league playoff series against the Chicago American Giants to win the pennant.
The first game was played in Washington at Griffith stadium on the evening of Tuesday, September 21. The Black Barons took the opener 4 to 2, with Al Saylor on the mound for Birmingham facing Wright. A second game was played on Thursday in Baltimore, but it was called after 12 innings with the score tied 5 to 5. The next evening, they played again in Griffith Stadium before 7,000 fans. It again went to extra innings, and the Grays were able to win 4 to 3 to tie the series at one game apiece.
The next three games were played in Chicago, Columbus Ohio, and Indianapolis—the Negro World Series usually included several games held in neutral sites. On Sunday afternoon, September 26, the Grays beat the Black Barons 9 to 0 at Comiskey Park. They scored runs in the second (on an Easterling double) and third (on a Leonard triple) before breaking it open with six runs in the 6th. Wright pitched a 5-hit shutout. On Tuesday night, September 28, the Black Barons defeated the Grays 11 to 10 in Columbus. The Grays pulled ahead 6 to 2, but the Barons tied it in the bottom of the fifth and scored 5 more in the 7th to take an 11-6 lead. Gibson hit a grand slam home run in the 8th to narrow the lead to one run, but the Barons held on to win and tie the series at two games each. The next evening in Indianapolis, the Grays regained the lead with an 8-0 victory in Indianapolis. Wright again pitched a shutout, allowing 8 hits.
The series continued on Sunday October 3 at Rickwood Park in Birmingham. This time it was a pitching duel, with both Birmingham’s John Markham and Washington’s Partlow pitching 10 scoreless innings before Partlow allowed a two-out triple to Birmingham’s Leonard Lindsay, followed by a single from Ed Steele for a 1 to 0 walk-off win. The series was tied at three games each. The finale was played on Tuesday October 5 at Rickwood Park. Wright was pitching for Washington, but he was knocked out in the sixth inning when the Black Barons took a 4-2 lead. Brown came on in relief. In the top of the 8th, Leonard walked and Gibson, Easterling, Harris, and Bankhead each singled, scoring four runs and giving the Grays a 6-4 lead. They added two more in the 9th and won the game 8-4, clinching their first World Series title. Additional titles would follow in 1944 and in 1948.
References
I relied on contemporary newspaper articles from the Baltimore Afro American, which are available from Google News Archives.
For general background on the Homestead Grays during their Washington years, see Brad Snyder,Beyond the Shadow of the Senators: The Untold Story of the Homestead Grays and the Integration of Baseball, Contemporary Books, 2003.
The Nationals entered September with a 68-67 record, 7-1/2 behind the Reds for the wild card, and with the division title far out of reach. Davey Johnson, perhaps prescient, insisted throughout the month that the Nats would need to win 90 to have a shot at the post-season. That would require the Nats to go 22-5 in September, with the Reds going no better than 14-12. No wonder that according to coolstandings.com, the Nats’ odds of making the wild card were only 2.9%, but the team remained hopeful.
The month began at home with the last game of a series against the Mets. The Nats came from behind to win it 6-5, and the Reds lost, narrowing the gap to 6-1/2.
Next came a road trip that began against the Phillies. The Nats lost the first game when Tyler Clippard gave up the lead in the 8th. The Nats managed to win the next two, though. Meanwhile, the Reds also won two of three, maintaining their lead. On to Miami, where the Nats again took two of three. The Reds, however, won four straight, extending their lead to 8 games. On to New York, where the Nats’ offense exploded against the Mets, scoring 25 runs led by three home runs by Ryan Zimmerman on top of three he had just hit against the Marlins, sweeping the four game set against the Mets. The Reds went 1-2, and the gap narrowed to 5-1/2 games.
Returning home, the Nats faced the Phillies and took two of three. The Reds took one of three, and the lead narrowed to 4-1/2. The problem, however, was that the Nationals’ schedule was about to get tougher and the Reds’ schedule was about to get easier. The first game of a 3-game set against the Braves was rescheduled as part of a day-night doubleheader after the Navy Yard shooting, and it was a topsy-turvy match that the Nats finally won in walk-off fashion against Kimbrel. The Nats also took the nightcap to sweep the doubleheader, but lost the series finale the next day. The Reds won all three of their games, extending their lead to 5-1/2. The Nats home stand ended against the Marlins, and they had to sweep to keep their remote playoff chances alive. They lost game 3, however, and the team was now only one game away from elimination.
The end came the next night in St. Louis, where the Cardinals behind Adam Wainwright beat the Nats 4 to 3. The Cards went on to sweep the Nats before the Nats went on to take the first two against the Diamondbacks in Arizona, thereby ensuring that Johnson would retire with a managerial record 300 games over .500. The Nats lost the season finale, fielding a spring-training style team of bench players and call-ups.
Despite the disappointment, September was by far the Nats’ best month. They went 18-9, scoring 4.7 runs per game and allowing only 2.9. Jayson Werth, Ryan Zimmerman, Wilson Ramos, and Denard Span, who completed a 29 game hiring streak, longest in the majors this season, all excelled with the bat. The Nats’ wRC+ was 104, third highest in the NL in September, and they were second in the league in runs scored. Their starters’ ERA was 2.77, also second in the league, and the relievers’ ERA of 2.63 ranked fourth. With the Nats’ projected starters for the season all healthy except for Ross Detwiler, fans could see that the pre-season hype wasn’t entirely misplaced. Now we look forward to an interesting hot stove season.
Record:
18-9 (.667)
Pythagorean Record:
19-8 (4.70 R/G – 2.93 RA/G)
MVP for September:
Jayson Werth (.302/.398/.542, 26 G, 113 PA, 4 HR, 17 R, 18 RBI, 1.0 fWAR, 13.26 RE24).
Most valuable pitcher:
Tanner Roark (3-1, 2.03 R/9, 5 G, 31 IP, 6.1 K/9, 1.2 BB/9, 7.75 RE24).
Most valuable reliever:
Rafael Soriano (1-0, 0.00 R/9, 10 G, 10 IP, 7.2 K/9, 3.6 BB/9, 5.4 H/9, 4.63 RE24, 0.92 WPA, 6 shutdowns, 0 meltdown).
Worst month:
Ian Krol (1–0, 11.57 R/9, –3.55 RE24, 5 G, 2-1/3 IP, 6 H, 1 HR, 1 BB, 71.4% LOB%, 0 shutdown, 2 meltdowns).
Best start this month:
Two starts share the honor: Gio Gonzalez (September 9, 9–0 win over the Mets in New York) pitched a one-hit shutout with 8 strikeouts and 2 walks with a game score of 91. Jordan Zimmermann (September 20, 8–0 win over the Marlins at home) pitched a two-hit shutout with 9 strikeouts and 1 walk, also for a game score of 91.
Worst start:
Dan Haren (September 6, 7–0 loss to the Marlins in Miami) lasted 3 innings and gave up 6 hits, 5 runs, 2 walks, and 1 home run, while getting 5 K with a game score of 30.
Tough losses:
Gio Gonzalez (September 24, 2–0 loss to the Cardinals in St. Louis) pitched 7 innings and gave up 2 runs on 6 hits with no walks and 6 strikeouts (game score 63); unfortunately, the opposing picher Michael Wacha, went one out away from a no-hitter before Ryan Zimmerman finally beat out an infield single. Ross Ohlendorf (September 18, 5–2 loss to the Braves at home) gave up 3 runs on 4 hits (2 HR) with no walks and 6 strikeouts in 6 innings (game score 58). Jordan Zimmermann (September 25, 4–1 loss to the Cardinals in St. Louis) gave up 4 runs on 6 hits (1 HR) with no walks and 2 strikeouts in 7 innings (game score 51).
Cheap win:
Jordan Zimmermann (September 10, 6–3 win over the Mets in New York) pitched 5 innings and gave up 3 runs on 8 hits with 1 walk and 4 strikeouts (game score 42).
Best shutdown:
Rafael Soriano (September 4, 3–2 win over the Phillies in Philadelphia) saved a one-run game, setting down three Phillies batters in order. (Win probability added .188).
Worst meltdown:
Tyler Clippard (September 2, 3–2 loss to the Phillies in Philadelphia) entered in the bottom of the 8th with a 2–1 lead. He got the first two batters out, then gave up a walk, a game-tying double, an intentional walk, and another single to give up the lead, before getting the final out. (Win probability added –.581)
Clutch hit:
Denard Span (September 17, 6–5 win over the Braves at home). In a wild game that had been rescheduled due to the Navy Yard shootings, Span came to bat in the bottom of the ninth against the Braves’ dominant closer, Craig Kimbrel, with one out, runners on second and third, and the Nats trailing 5–4. He hit a sharp ground ball to shortstop Andrelton Simmons, driving in Jeff Kobernus. Simmons booted the ball, allowing Anthony Rendon to score from second, giving the Nats the walk-off victory and Kimbrel his first, ever two-run blown save. (WPA .472) If you object to giving the clutch hit award to a reached-on-error, the runner-up was Jayson Werth for his two-out RBI double in the bottom of the 8th, giving the Nats the lead in their 6–5 win over the Mets at home on September 1 (WPA .321).
Choke:
Wilson Ramos (September 2, 3–2 loss to the Phillies in Philadelphia) struck out in the top of the ninth with the Nats trailing 3–2, one out, and runners on first and third (WPA –.212). Anthony Rendon followed with a game-ending strikeout.
Davey Johnson played for Earl Weaver for five years and is often thought of as his protégé. Weaver’s teams, of course, are known for excellent pitching and three-run homers. Johnson definitely supports the three-run homer, but I don’t really see Weaver’s influence so much in their management of pitching staffs.*
* In an earlier post, I noted Davey’s strong tendency to try to let a pitcher work his way out of trouble and finish an inning, a strategy that was not characteristic of Weaver.
Weaver wrote an excellent book, Weaver on Strategy, which distills his ideas on managing in a fun-to-read form. One section is titled, “How to tell if a pitcher is losing his edge.” Consider rule # 1:
Pay attention to foul balls. When a pitcher gets in a good groove, the hitters will usually foul his deliveries straight back. There’ll be plenty of foul tips. But if the hitters start making solid contact and belting the ball down the lines, watch out: they’re catching up with the guy on the mound.
The other rules are good too: Watch the catcher. See if the pitcher starts taking longer pauses between pitches. Beware of leadoff walks. Watch if weak hitters start pulling the ball. Watch where the pitches are going when they miss the strike zone. Watch the pitcher’s delivery. Weaver then adds that a couple of hard-hit balls can tell you all you need to know about what a pitcher has left.
I’ve often thought of these rules, especially this evening. When Uggla clobbered Ross Ohlendorf‘s first pitch in the sixth inning for a deep home run, I was concerned, especially in view of Ohlendorf’s long-standing difficulties going deep into games. If I were managing and I didn’t have someone warming up already, I would have had them warming up immediately. But then, two batters later, when Terdoslavich pulled a ball down the line, only a few feet from being the second home run of the inning, I knew Ohlendorf was done. I was shocked that Davey left him in to face Upton.
I don’t blame Ohlendorf for tonight’s loss as much as I blame Davey. And listening to his post-game interview, it’s clear that Davey wasn’t paying any attention to Earl Weaver’s rules for when a pitcher loses his edge.
Saturday marked the anniversary of the shutdown of Stephen Strasburg. Like many Nats fans, I was taken aback at how his impending shutdown seemed to dominate the sports channels during the last weeks of summer last year; how broadcasters and sportswriters seemed to think that if they kept arguing with enough vehemence, Mike Rizzo would recognize the errors of his ways and reverse course.
Of course, the shutdown went forward as had been planned for many months, and the Nats went on to lose the division championship series. Now that some time has passed, how do the arguments stand up?
There’s a sense in which both sides have won.
It’s impossible, of course, to demonstrate that the shutdown may have saved Strasburg’s arm. If anything, he’s pitching more poorly this season. Nevertheless, the Nats’ decision to limit the innings of a young pitcher coming off Tommy John surgery continues to be the norm in baseball. If Rizzo had ignored the norm and allowed Strasburg to pitch more innings, and Strasburg were subsequently injured, the outcry would have been deafening. Rizzo, rather than pushing the envelope, was merely reflecting the current consensus on handling recovery from Tommy John surgery.
Furthermore, as Nats fans have frequently pointed out, the shutdown had no effect on the NLDS outcome. Absent the shutdown, Strasburg would have pitched one game, and Ross Detwiler would not have started. Detwiler pitched brilliantly in his one game and the Nats won. Absent some creative fiction, it’s hard to argue that Strasburg’s absence from the rotation had any impact on the outcome of the series. Of course, one shouldn’t evaluate decisions made in uncertainty based on the actual outcomes, but the actual outcome does illustrate analysis that suggested that any single player was unlikely to change the outcome of a short series.
The last year has also demonstrated that the critics of the shutdown were right about one really big issue—you can’t take post-season opportunities for granted. A year ago, most Nats fans were convinced that the team had become a dynasty and would have many post-season opportunities. At this point, we see that teams that look good on paper at the beginning of the season don’t always deliver. A team shouldn’t let it’s post-season chances go to waste.
This leads to another argument that deserves more attention—the Nats shouldn’t have been so inflexible in their planning. There are ways to keep to an innings limit without making a player ineligible for the post-season, but Rizzo was set on his plan and didn’t want to consider any alternatives. Kris Medlen had his Tommy John surgery at almost the same time as Strasburg, but he was able to start the wild card game for the Braves because he spent the first half of the season as a reliever. My own favorite alternative approach would have been to have Strasburg start once a week—an approach that was later endorsed by sabermetrician Tangotiger. Someday I expect to see most outstanding young pitchers who are on innings limits, whether due to surgery or simply to build up arm strength, to be placed on a Saturday-only schedule as suggested by Tango.
Thinking about the shutdown makes me think about how inconsistently the Nationals have been about investing in players’ long term health. The Nats’ other franchise player, Bryce Harper, is a case study. His second season has been seriously derailed because they never fully recognized that he was seriously injured when he crashed into a couple of walls, and have rushed him back into service rather than giving him time to fully recover. There seems to be an incongruity between the protectiveness applied to the team’s franchise pitcher and the seeming nonchalance about serious injuries to their franchise position player.
The team is also guilty of some serious pitcher abuse in the case of Ross Ohlendorf. Asked to start in the second game of a doubleheader against the Mets on July 26, facing Mets ace Matt Harvey, Ohlendorf pitched brilliantly, allowing 6 hits and 1 run over 7 innings. By the seventh inning, however, it was obvious that he was out of gas, but Davey didn’t have anyone warming up in the bullpen and had Ohlendorf work his way out of trouble. He did, and the Nationals went on to win with a ninth inning walk-off homer from Ryan Zimmerman. But Ohlendorf hasn’t been the same pitcher since. He had to go on the 15-day disabled list, and in 5 games since the Mets game, he has a 6.32 ERA in 15-2/3 innings. (In contrast, his ERA in his first 9 games through the Mets game was 1.87 in 33-2/3 innings.)
So while I appreciate the commitment to players’ health demonstrated by last season’s innings limits for Strasburg, I wish the principle were applied more consistently, and flexibly, to all of the players on the team.
The Nationals entered the month 4 games below .500, 11 games back of the Braves, and 7-1/2 games behind the Reds in the wild card race. Another month of playing near .500 ball would have removed any post-season hopes. After a lackluster start, they finally kicked things up toward the end of the month, winning 8 of their last 11 and ended the month with a 16–11 record. They finished the month 15 games behind the Braves, with the divisional race far out of reach, but maintained pace with the Reds for the wild card, 7-1/2 games behind. According to coolstandings.com, the Nats’ odds of making the wild card fell to 2.9%, but facing a generally weak schedule, the team remained hopeful of making a final month surge accompanied by a collapse by their opponent.
As the months began, the Nats were finishing a road trip against the Brewers, and beat them two games to one. They returned home to face the Braves, needing to sweep the series to retain any sliver of hope in the divisional race. Instead, the Braves swept them, winning the first two games by one run apiece, and setting the Nats’ divisional aspirations out of reach for this season.
Series with the Braves and Giants followed, and things started to look up when the Nats swept the Phillies. They were one out away from sweeping the Giants as well, but Rafael Sorano gave up a two-run lead in the final inning of the last Giants game.
The next road trip began against the Braves, and it was a strange series. The Braves won the first game 3–2, and Bryce Harper was twice hit by a pitch, which came on top of another apparently intentional plunking during the previous Braves series in Washington. Stephen Strasburg, protecting his teammate, drilled Justin Upton in the first inning of the next game, and the score appeared to be settled. But in the second inning, his control unraveled and he was ejected after twice pitching behind Adrelton Simmons. The game went on to extra innings and the Nats finally won, 8–7, in the 15th inning after an Adam LaRoche home run. The extra-inning effort appeared to have sapped their energy, though, as the Nats lost their final game against the Braves and were blown out in the first of a four-game series against the Cubs. They then regrouped and won the next three games, as well as the first two of three against the Royals, losing the final game.
Returning home, the Nats faced the Marlins and the Mets. They swept the Marlins, but ended the month with two losses against the Mets.
Where did the Nats improve? For the first time this season, the Nats’ batting was above average. Their wRC+ for the month was 116, tops in the National League. Starting pitching was also pretty good, with a 3.67 ERA for the month ranking fifth in the league. But relief pitching was a weakness, with their relievers’ ERA of 3.99 ranking 11th in the league.
Record:
16–11 (.593)
Pythagorean Record:
16–11 (4.74 R/G – 4.04 RA/G)
MVP for August:
Jayson Werth (.380/.468/.620, 26 G, 109 PA, 6 HR, 20 R, 21 RBI, 1.4 fWAR, 1.63 WPA, 13.50 RE24).
Most valuable pitcher:
Stephen Strasburg (1–0, 2.60 R/9, 5 G, 27-2/3 IP, 9.8 K/9, 2.3 BB/9, 4.54 RE24, 0.8 rWAR).
Most valuable reliever:
Tanner Roark (4-0, 1.59 R/9, 9 G, 22-2/3 IP, 7.5 K/9, 2.8 BB/9, 5.6 H/9, 5.03 RE24, 0.58 WPA, 5 shutdowns, 1 meltdown).
Worst month:
Ryan Mattheus (0–1, 11.05 R/9, –5.09 RE24, 9 G, 7-1/3 IP, 15 H, 1 HR, 4 BB, 56.8% LOB%, 1 shutdown, 3 meltdowns). A short trip to Syracuse didn’t help Mattheus, as he seemed just as lost when he returned.
Best start this month:
Stephen Strasburg (August 11, 6–0 win over the Phillies at home). Strasburg pitched a shutout—his first career complete game—and gave up 4 hits , 1 walk, and got 10 K with a game score of 88 for the best start of his career according to game score.
Worst start:
Gio Gonzalez (August 23, 11–10 win over the Royals in Kansas City). Gonzalez lasted 3-1/3 innings and gave up 10 hits, 7 runs, 3 walks, and 2 home runs, while getting only 1 K with a game score of 10.
Tough losses:
Gio Gonzalez (August 18, 2–1 loss to the Braves) gave up 2 runs on 5 hits and 4 walks, while striking out 9, in 7 innings (game score 64). Gio Gonzalez (August 6, 2–1 loss to the Braves) gave up two runs on 6 hits and 1 walk, striking out 5, in 7 innings (game score 61). Jordan Zimmermann (August 24, 7–2 loss to the Royals) gave up 3 runs on 6 hits (1 HR) and 1 walk, striking out 6 in 7-2/3 innings (game score 60).
Cheap win:
None.
Best shutdown:
Craig Stammen (August 17, 8–7 win over the Braves in Atlanta). He pitched 3 scoreless innings (innings 12 through 14) in a 7–7 tie, giving up no hits and 1 walk. He got the win after Adam LaRoche hit a home run in the top of the 15th and Dan Haren came in for the save. (Win probability added .390).
Worst meltdown:
Rafael Soriano (August 15, 4–3 loss to the Giants at home) entered in the top of the 9th with a 3–1 lead. He gave up a leadoff single to Buster Posey, then with two outs walked Roger Kieschnick. Facing the Giant’s backup catcher, Hector Sanchez, as a pinch hitter, Soriano gave up a 3-run home run and the lead. The Nats were unable to score in the bottom of the ninth and lost a game that they should have won. (Win probability added –.749)
Clutch hit:
Scott Hairston (August 21, 11–6 win over the Cubs in Chicago). With the score tied 6–6, in the top of the seventh, Bryce Harper hit a 2-out double and the Cubs intentionally walked Jayson Werth to get to Hairston. Hairston responded with a 3-run blast, putting the Nats ahead 9–6. (WPA .398)
Choke:
Scott Hairston (August 5, 3–2 loss to the Braves at home) came in as a pinch hitter with runners on second and third and one out in the bottom of the ninth, trailing the Braves 3–2. With Kimbrel unavailable, Jordan Walden was on the mound. Hairston fouled out to the catcher and was unable to drive in a run (WPA –.247). Chad Tracy followed with a game-ending fly ball out.
This afternoon the Nats announced that they had acquired outfielder David DeJesus from the Chicago Cubs and had released Roger Bernadina.
Many Nats fans are undoubtedly wondering why this move was made. Yes, Bernadina has been an awful hitter this season, with no signs of coming out of his slump. And DeJesus is a pretty good acquisition, especially as a fourth outfielder—a league average hitter and fielder who can play all three positions.
But why now, when the odds of making the wild-card play-in game are so minuscule? This is the kind of move that should have been made six or seven weeks ago when it could have moved the team’s playoff odds.
Maybe Mike Rizzo is simply tardy, but the other possibility is that this deal is mostly about the option year. DeJesus’s contract includes a $6.5 million team option for 2014. Maybe Rizzo has convinced the Lerner’s that they need to spend some real money on the bench next year to avoid a repeat of this season’s bench debacle. $6.5 million is a lot for a fourth outfielder, but it could be less than for an equivalent free agent. Also, a free agent might insist on a two-year deal, whereas Rizzo has been very reluctant to sign marginal players in their 30s to multi-year deals.
I guess in a few weeks we’ll find out if it really is about the option year.
With the divisional race now out of reach and the wild card drifting farther and farther, writers are turning to the blame game. According to Tom Boswell of the Washington Post, the Nat’s problem is that they don’t execute fundamental baseball:
… another huge Nats problem, and the one that absolutely must be solved before anything really good can happen, is that they play the game badly at the fundamental level night after infuriating night. The Nats think, correctly, that they are talented. But bad baseball always beats talent. The Nats aren’t winning because the way they’ve played, they don’t merit it.
According to Rachel Levitan, writing at MASN’s Nationals Buzz, the team’s problem is lack of passion:
… this is exactly what’s bothering me about this Nats team. Where’s the fire? Where’s the passion?
In both cases, the writer sees the disappointing outcomes not as the result of bad luck, or lack of ability, or poor management, but as a MORAL failure—they don’t merit winning because they haven’t learned and executed the fundamentals or because they aren’t bringing the right attitude. That’s a very common theme in sports writing—sports is a morality play in which winning is the result of moral superiority and losing is the punishment for moral failings.
Fortunately, Harper at Nationals Baseball has demolished Boswell’s argument, showing that the Nats’ failures in the so-called fundamentals are really pretty small in magnitude and have little to do with putting together a winning team. I won’t spend time on Levitan’s argument about passion, except to say that if passion is indeed their problem, we will also see it in their statistics. Instead, I’d like to walk through how I like to look at this from an analytical perspective. A couple of weeks ago, I walked through some of the numbers. This time, I’d like to talk my way through the concepts.
Let’s start with why everyone pre-season was picking the Nationals to dominate the National League this year. I think most people started with the Nationals win-loss record last year—98 wins, the most in baseball—and then started making various additions and subtractions. Stephen Strasburg and Bryce Harper will be available all season. Most of the players are young and are likely to improve. Wilson Ramos will be back. They added Rafael Soriano to the bullpen. All were reasons to add some wins. On the other hand, Adam LaRoche had just had his best season at age 32 and probably wasn’t going to be that good. Several other players, such as Ross Detwiler, Danny Espinosa, and Ian Desmond, hadn’t had sustained success yet, and several might regress. You have to allow for injuries. All of these were reasons to subtract a few wins.
If you approach it that way, a lot of people were guessing that the Nats might win anywhere from 92 to more than 100 games. I’m going to suggest that that wasn’t the best way to approach the problem of projecting performance.
Analysts—especially those who forecast player performance—tend to think of players having an unobservable “true talent” level, which unfortunately is clouded by a lot of statistical noise. In some cases, true talent levels may be exposed relatively quickly. For example, abilities for walking or striking out may be relatively well measured in as few as a couple hundred plate appearances. But other abilities, and in particular, a player’s overall true talent level, may take several years to fully reveal itself. We get fooled all the time—Todd Frazier got some Rookie of the Year votes and sure looked like a great player—Oops! Wait a minute.
The problem is that even while we’re gradually learning about a player’s true talent, their talent is also changing. For a young player, it’s often learning or improvement in skills—Anthony Rendon is learning to turn the double play. But as time goes on, more often the changes in true talent are the effects of injuries or of aging. It can be tough to identify changes in true talent.
So returning to our question, “Why were we so wrong?” there are several possible explanations:
- Maybe the 2012 Nats played above their true talent level, leading to faulty expectations.
- As we’ve seen more data and learned more about the players this season, we may be learning that their true talent level isn’t as high as we thought a year ago.
- Maybe their true talent levels have declined due to injury, aging, or other reasons.
- Maybe the 2013 Nats are playing below their true talent level due to bad luck or a myriad of other possible reasons.
Fortunately, their are some numbers available that let us get a sense of how important each of these explanations are. In particular, I particularly find useful a couple of datasets at fangraphs.com. First, there’s their positional power rankings from the beginning of the season. This represents a systematic forecast of each team and player’s performance based on the information that was available pre-season. Although it’s not exactly the same thing as # 1 because of personnel changes between 2012 and 2013, it does give us a pretty good idea of what a systematic, unbiased projection system thought the Nationals true talent levels were at the beginning of this season. The other resources are their projected standings and team depth charts, which provide an updated version of those projections based on currently available information. In particular, the projected rest of season numbers provide an objective estimate of their current true talent levels.
So which of our four explanations is most important in explaining the disappointment. I think # 1 may actually be most important—we gave too much credit to the 2012 team relative to their true talent. The pre-season positional power rankings indicated that the Nationals were not a 98-win team, but instead were projected for approximately 88 wins. Furthermore, rather than walking away with the NL East, as most analysts were projecting, the fangraphs assessment showed the Nationals neck-and-neck with the Braves. I remember feeling a sense of shock when I first went through those rankings, but as I examined the projections more carefully, I decided that they were actually quite solid and that the Nationals had more holes in their lineup than I had realized.
In particular, that assessment indicated in advance two problem areas that most fans weren’t thinking of. The bullpen, despite the addition of Soriano, was only ranked as mediocore. And although the projections didn’t expose just how dreadful the bench would turn out to be, it did indicate that the bench was not a strength. Both projections were prescient.
On the issue of the bench, Bill James just posted this comment on his “Hey Bill” Q&A page:
One of the key differences between a contending team and a second-division team is that a team like the Red Sox has players coming off the bench, like Jonny Gomes and Mike Carp, who are clearly above replacement level, whereas the bench of a second-division team consists entirely of replacement-level players.
Although no one could have forecast how dreadful the Nats’ bench would be, there clearly were signals that the bench probably wouldn’t be as strong as in 2012. With Mike Rizzo spending some money to try to strengthen the team during the off-season, he really should have spent more time and money on the bench.
Going back to our four explanations for our miss on the Nats’ performance, I guess I would rank the second most important as being that the 2013 team has played below their true talent level. The fangraphs current projected rest-of-season winning percentage for the Nats is .524 (or 85 wins over a full season). I think that’s a rough estimate of their current true talent level, and you can see that it’s only deteriorated a bit from where it was at the beginning of the season. At present, the Nats are 6 games below a .524 winning percentage. This difference between actual performance and true talent could be due to luck, or to any of the other factors like fundamentals that sports writers love to emphasize. It’s certainly within the usual range for luck, though, so we can’t rule out the idea that they’ve simply had some bad luck.
The other two factors, changes in true talent and learning more about players’ true talent, receive the most attention but are probably the least important overall. I’ve already written about some of these issues—for example, in the case of Strasburg, his decline in strikeout rate and increase in walk rate, which are both statistics that stabilize at new levels relatively quickly, seems to be indicative of an actual decline in his talent level. As a Nats fan, I’m quite concerned by this apparent diminution in talent. Other players for whom injuries or aging appear to have resulted in talent declines include Ryan Zimmerman, Danny Espinosa, Drew Storen, and possibly Adam LaRoche.
For many of their other players, however, a comparison of their beginning-of-year and current projections indicate minor adjustments to the estimates of true talent, but maybe not any actual change in those levels. For example, although Gio Gonzalez has given up more home runs this season than last, his strikeout and walk rates have barely budged, and the projections have barely budged as well. The change in home run rates seems to mostly be a matter of luck. In the case of Desmond, even though his performance this season is slightly below last season’s his projected true talent has actually gone up, as the projection now recognizes that his 2012 season was not a fluke and was close to his true talent.
Over the coming weeks, I’ll be writing more about the Nats players as we try to establish the team’s needs for the off season. But I come away from this discussion with the following message. Last season’s team was not as good as it looked at the time, but neither is this season’s team nearly as bad as it may seem. The fangraphs rest-of-season projection actually has the Braves at .525, neck-and-neck with the Nationals. In other words, if we were able to get a reboot on the season, we should be perfectly matched, talent-wise, with our divisional competitor. While that doesn’t let us off the hook for doing something this off-season, it does suggest that the situation is not completely dire and we don’t have to think about a major re-build.
Last year, after Stephen Strasburg completed his 33rd career start on June 30, 2012, I wrote a post noting that he had completed the equivalent of a full season and looked at how he’d done. With his last start in Detroit, he’s now at 66 career starts and has completed the equivalent of a second full season, so it seems like an opportune time to see how he’s changed over the last 13 months.
This post will also kick off a series of posts I’d like to do, looking at the team’s key personnel and how they fit into the team’s prospects for 2014 going forward. (I haven’t completely given up on 2013, but I’m realistic enough to recognize that 2014 should now be the team’s most important focus.)
| Period | W | L | ERA | IP | HR | BB | SO | SO/BB | FIP | IP/G |
| First 33* | 15 | 7 | 2.68 | 185 | 11 | 46 | 238 | 5.17 | 2.09 | 5.6 |
| Second 33** | 11 | 12 | 3.26 | 196.2 | 21 | 62 | 209 | 3.37 | 3.41 | 5.9 |
* 6/8/2010 thru 6/30/2012
** 7/6/2012 thru 7/30/2013
We can see that with the exception of innings pitched, every statistic has declined. In his 33 starts since July 2012, Strasburg has given up more runs, more home runs, and more walks, and has gotten fewer strikeouts than he had in his first 33 starts. If we do those comparisons on a per-batter-faced basis, his home runs increased from 1.50% to 2.60%, his walks increased from 6.26% to 7.67%, and his strikeouts decreased from 32.38% to 25.87%.
In my earlier post, I compared his first-season-equivalent performance with the MLB leaders in 2011. Those comparisons looked pretty good—if his first 33 starts had all been completed during the 2011 season, he would have ranked sixth in the majors in ERA, ninth in fewest home runs allowed (among qualified pitchers), third in strikeouts, fourth in strikeout-to-walk ratio, and first in fielding-independent pitching (FIP). If we make a similar set of comparisons of his second set of 33 starts to the 2012 MLB leaders, Strasburg’s performance looks much less impressive. If starts 34 through 66 had all occurred during 2012, Strasburg would have ranked 16th in ERA, 40th in fewest home runs allowed, 9th in strikeouts, 28th in strikeout-to-walk ratio, and 19th in FIP.
Over the last 13 months, Strasburg has basically slid from being perhaps one of the top five pitchers in baseball, with comparisons made to Pedro Martinez in his prime, to maybe one of the top 20 or 25. In fact, it’s no longer clear that Strasburg is even the Nats’ best pitcher. It’s funny—when Nats fans and bloggers talk about why the team has disappointed, they talk a lot about Denard Span and how his on-base percentage is maybe 10 points lower than it should be. Span is not the problem the Nats should be worried about. They should be much more worried about Strasburg’s FIP being up 1.3 runs per game, and about Ryan Zimmerman‘s fielding and Adam LaRoche‘s hitting. Those are the problems, along with an incredibly weak bench and a disappointing bullpen and Dan Haren‘s strugges, that have caused the Nats to miss their expectations by so much.
What’s caused Strasburg’s performance to slip? It’s hard to point to any one thing. Turning to the annual data (I didn’t try compiling pitched ball data across the 33 game periods), we see that his fastball velocity, which averaged 97 during 2010 pre-Tommy John surgery, has never regained that level and has continued to slip a bit, down 0.5 mph this season from 95.8 to 95.3. Although the increase in walks and hit-by-pitch suggest control problems, I don’t see a significant decrease in his percent of pitches in the zone. But there is more contact and fewer swinging strikes. Batters seem to be seeing his fastball better and are making better contact with it, which gives him fewer opportunities to turn to his still excellent curveball and change-up.
In putting together a list of players with the highest trade value, Dave Cameron of fangraphs.com recently gave a nice summary of Strasburg’s current status, which I pretty much agree with:
He’s still an excellent pitcher, but it’s been awhile since he looked like the best pitcher on the planet. He might not ever look like that again… It is likely that Stephen Strasburg peaked in 2010, as a rookie.
All that negativity aside, teams would still be lining up out the door if the Nationals made him available. He’s got three years of team control left at arbitration prices, and the low innings totals and lack of sexy win numbers this year will keep his price reasonable. He still throws 95, gets strikeouts and ground balls, and has an ERA of 2.99. He might be worse, but worse than historically amazing isn’t so bad.
Strasburg is both terrific and kind of disappointing at the same time.
It’s really, really tough for a pitcher to maintain elite status year after year. Pitchers can and sometimes do re-gain that status—maybe they pick up a new pitch or make some change in mechanics to improve their command. But most don’t. While we remain hopeful that Strasburg may eventually reach the heights that originally looked possible, the reality may be that we’re looking forward to several seasons of a merely very, very good pitcher, and not an historically great one.
