Managers,
It’s getting late in the game, and your starter’s pitch count is getting high. It’s still a close game, you’ve got a runner on base, and your pitcher is coming to bat. Should you lift him for a pinch hitter?
Because calculating the win expectancies may be challenging even for a manager who majored in math, let me suggest that you use a simple rule of thumb. Ask yourself, “If my pitcher walks the first guy he faces in the next inning, will I lift him for a reliever?” If the answer is yes, then send in a pinch hitter now. The extra pitching value from leaving him in to face one or two or three more batters won’t be as great as the offensive value given up by having your pitcher bat in a high leverage situation.
Jim Riggleman used to get this strategy wrong, and yesterday Davey Johnson got it wrong as well.
July was a rough month for the Nats. The pitching was shaky throughout the month and several times imploded, while the offense continued to struggle. The team began the month having a plausible case for a wild card run and ended it five games below .500.
Except where noted, all statistics are for the month of July only.
Record:
11–15 (.423) for July – ending the month at 51–56 (.477) for the season.
Pythagorean Record:
10–16 (3.81 R/G – 4.73 RA/G).
MVP for July:
Tyler Clippard (0-0, 0.57 ERA, 12 G, 15-2/3 IP, 9.8 K/9, 2.9 BB/9, 0.6 HR/9, 0.64 WHIP, 0 of 4 inherited runners scored, 2.61 FIP, 3.43 xFIP, 1.0 rWAR, 8 shutdowns, 1 meltdown).
Most valuable position player:
Michael Morse (.344/.400/.533, 24 G, 100 PA, 2 HR, 12 R, 13 RBI, 159 wRC+, 0.8 fWAR). Wilson Ramos (.286/.348/.508) was also a candidate.
Most valuable starting pitcher:
Yunesky Maya (1 GS, 1–0, 0.00 ERA, 5-1/3 IP). Ok, I’m being facetious, but none of the regular starters did very well this month—John Lannan had the best ERA of Nats pitchers with two or more starts with 4.18 (the NL average this season is 3.81).
Best start this month:
Jordan Zimmermann (July 10, 2–0 win over Colorado at home, 6-1/3 innings, 4 H, 0 BB, 6 SO, Game score of 71).
Worst start:
Jason Marquis (July 3, 10–2 loss to Pittsburgh at home, 1-1/3 IP, 8 H, 7 R, 6 ER, 0 BB, 0 SO, Game score of 12).
Best shutdown:
Tyler Clippard (July 20, 3–2 loss to the Astros in Houston). Clip came into the game in the bottom of the eighth with the game tied 2–2, runners on first and second, and no outs. After a sacrifice bunt advanced the runners, he got the last two outs on a foul popup and a strikeout. He then pitched a scoreless ninth, striking out two (win probability added of .380). Two innings later, the Astros scored the winning run off Todd Coffey.
Worst meltdown:
Henry Rodríguez (July 7, 10–9 loss to the Cubs in Washington). He had the distinction of giving up the go-ahead run twice. Entering in the top of the eighth with the score tied 8–8, Rodríguez gave up a two-out double to Starlin Castro followed by a run-scording single to Aramis Ramírez. In the bottom of the eighth the Nats tied it again 9–9, and Rodríguez came out to work the ninth. Giving up a single to Geovany Soto and a double to Darwin Barney, the Cubs took a 10–9 lead that they wouldn’t yield (WPA of –.516).
Clutch hit:
Danny Espinosa (July 17, 9–8 loss to the Braves in Atlanta). It was the top of the sixth, two outs, Roger Bernadina on first, and the Nats behind 7–6. Espinosa hit a home run to give the Nats the lead (WPA of .336). Alas, his clutch hit turned out be in vain as the Braves came back to tie it in the eighth and knocked in the winning run in the bottom of the ninth.
Choke:
Jayson Werth (July 9, 2–1 loss to the Rockies at home). In the bottom of the ninth with one out, runners on first and third, and the Nats down 2–1, Werth grounded into a game-ending double play (WPA of –.452). Lots of booing.
Clutch baserunning:
Jayson Werth (July 4, 5–4 win over the Cubs at home). In the bottom of the tenth, Werth walked, was advanced to second by a Liván Hernández sacrifice, stole third, and then scored the walk-off run on a wild pitch.
Likely to cool off:
Rick Ankiel – An unsustainable batting average on balls in play of .432 contributed to his July average of .327.
Likely to warm up:
Todd Coffey – His opponents’ batting average on balls in play of .405 for July also probably won’t persist.
Transactions:
Jason Marquis was traded to Arizona, and Jerry Hairston, Jr. to Milwaukee. The Nats picked up Jonny Gomes from Cincinnati—all for prospects—and the Nats released Matt Stairs.
Bryce Harper watch:
Promoted to Class AA Harrisburg on July 4 (and skipping high-A Potomac), Bryce Harper hit .238/.303/.325 in 23 games in the Eastern League.
First, I’m not that concerned about the big trade that didn’t happen—the one for the center fielder. July 31 really wasn’t the Nats’ deadline for getting this one done, and there may be some advantages to waiting. For example, I’m guessing that the Angels may be willing to shop Peter Bourjos this winter. I’ll give Mike Rizzo the benefit of the doubt and see if he can fill the center field hole over the winter.
Todd Coffey is the player I thought might be dealt, but wasn’t. I guess the market for a middle reliever with an ERA+ of 98 just isn’t that strong.
Turning to the trades that did happen, here are a few thoughts:
Unlike other commenters, I don’t think the trade for Jonny Gomes was mostly about the Type B free agent draft pick—after all, in order to get the draft pick, the Nats will have to offer Gomes arbitration and he’d have to turn them down. I’d guess that if the Nats do offer arbitration, there’s a good chance that he’ll accept it. Instead, I interpret the trade as a signal by Rizzo to Davey Johnson that he was listening and willing to support him when he said the team needed a right-handed pinch hitter. The minor leaguers the Nats gave up were marginal, so overall that was a pretty cheap and inconsequential trade.
Jerry Hairston, Jr. was traded to the Brewers for 23-year old Class AA outfielder Erik Komatsu. John Sickels of Minor League Ball rated Komatsu as a C+/C prospect and says
He has excellent strike zone judgment and is a very polished hitter, but as a tweener-type who lacks big power, he’ll likely fit best as a reserve outfielder.
Overall, that seems like a nice return for Hairston.
Jason Marquis was traded to the Diamondbacks for Class A infielder Zach Walters. John Sickels rated Walters as a C prospect, but says “an upgrade to C+ is plausible”:
A 21-year-old switch-hitter, Walters has an average throwing arm and average range, and has spent time at second base, third base, and shortstop this year. Second is his best position, but his versatility would make him an attractive roster option if he continues to hit at higher levels. He’s got doubles power and decent plate discipline, but his strikeout rate is rather high, which warns some adjustments may be needed.
While Walters seems like a decent prospect, I have to admit that I’m a bit disappointed that the Nats refused to negotiate partial or full payment of Marquis’ remaining salary. The Mets were able to get top prospect Zack Wheeler in exchange for Carlos Beltrán by offering to pay part of his remaining salary. While Marquis is obviously no Carlos Beltrán, I do think the Nats might have gotten a better prospect if they’d been willing to absorb some of Marquis’ salary. One of my biggest on-going concerns about the organization is whether (Jayson Werth‘s contract notwithstanding) they will be willing to spend enough on salaries to compete with the Phillies, Mets, and Braves.
We’re nearing the trade deadline, which means we’re at the peak the summer trade rumor season. It also means there’s lots of misinformation going around in news articles, blogs, and comments. Here are five common fallacies:
- Overvaluing our team’s players (and undervaluing the other team’s). When a fan’s been following and rooting for a team, it’s natural to become attached to the team’s players. But the simple fact of the matter is that the skills of players like Jason Marquis, Laynce Nix, and Todd Coffey are not that unique. Part of the reason that other teams may be interested in them is that they would come relatively cheaply. On the other hand, if we’re interest in buying elite, young players to fill some of our gaps, we’ll need to be willing to give up some of our own elite, young talent in exchange.
- Overlooking the traded player’s salary. Last winter I saw quite a few comments complaining that we didn’t get enough value in exchange for Josh Willingham. (In retrospect, obtaining Henry Rodríguez and Corey Brown for Willingham’s 2011 season doesn’t look bad at all.) The thing to keep in mind is that a player’s trade value should represent the surplus value—that is, the value of his expected performance minus his salary. Because Willingham was owed $6 million in salary, his surplus value simply wasn’t very large. In trading Willingham, Mike Rizzo was essentially competing against all the free agent outfielders that were on the market. All things considered, I think Rizzo did quite well with that trade.
- Paying too much attention to recent performance. We see this one all the time. Marquis’ trade value is said to have gone up because he pitched well in his last start. Carlos Beltran hit a home run, which supposedly should convince his reluctant suitors to offer their proposals. Now I’ll grant that some of baseball’s GMs aren’t exactly geniuses. Nevertheless, I’m convinced that every GM at least understands that statistics from very small samples, such as the last two or three weeks, don’t mean much. The only real information that they can learn from late-July performances is whether the player is still healthy.
- Confusing tradable with likely to be traded. Nats fans are outraged to hear that the team considers Drew Storen and Tyler Clippard to be tradable. Very few players are not tradable, in the sense that the GM will not even listen to another team’s offer. For the Nationals, my guess is that the list currently comprises Ryan Zimmerman, Bryce Harper, Stephen Strasburg, and Danny Espinosa, and I’ll throw in Jayson Werth because no other team would make an offer for him. Players like Storen and Clippard are tradable, but because they carry a lot of surplus value, they would only be traded if they were part of a big trade that brought a lot of value in return. For example, Jordan Zimmermann isn’t ordinarily likely to be traded, but he apparently was included in a proposed trade last winter for Zack Greinke. Ben Goessling of MASN has a nice article explaining that although Clippard and Storen are tradable, they aren’t actually likely to be traded.
- Treating rumors as reliable, disinterested information. After working in Washington for 25 years, I’ve learned that the unnamed sources for most rumors are the top people in the organization and the leaks are almost always intended to serve a strategic purpose. As far as I can tell, what’s true for politics is also true for private business and for professional sports. In some cases, it’s almost laughably easy to figure out why an organization is leaking certain rumors. For example – the Mets leak the rumor that they might be willing to trade Carlos Beltrán for Domonic Brown. Well, ‘duh’—of course they’d be willing to trade Beltrán for Brown—who wouldn’t? It seems pretty transparent that the purpose of the rumor is to signal to other teams that they’re expecting to get a lot of value for Beltrán and basically want to start the bidding at a high point. Of course, what they’re actually able to get for him may be another thing altogether. It’s not always so easy to figure out why a particular rumor was leaked (and some rumors are probably just inaccurate “noise”), but it’s best to assume that some rumors are intended to misinform rather than to inform.
It’s been a while since I posted links, so some of these may be getting a little long in the tooth. As usual, these are the links I’d like to remember.
- This article by Adam Kilgore and Dave Sheinin of The Washington Post was, in my opinion, the most insightful piece written on the resignation of Jim Riggleman.
- Speaking of Riggleman’s resignation, Joe Posnanski of SI.com wrote this article on the subject, and almost anything written by Poz is a link to remember.
- Eno Sarris of FanGraphs wants us to know that he did not write about Jordan Zimmermann and innings limits.
- Dave Cameron of FanGraphs ranked the top 50 players in trade value, and four of them were Nats: Ryan Zimmerman at #10, Bryce Harper at #20, Stephen Strasburg at #24, and Danny Espinosa at #48.
- It’s nearly six years late, but John Patterson receives an award from Rob Neyer of Baseball Nation honoring his 2005 season.
- John Lannan hits his his first career home run and gets a surprising reception when he returns to the dugout.
We’ve reached the point where the dimensions of a championship contending Nationals team are starting to take shape. If a few essential steps are taken over the next year and a half, the 2013 Nats could be a strong contender for a divisional title and post-season success.
Why 2013? While we see the team improving from 2011 to 2012, several key pieces won’t yet be fully in place next season. It will be Stephen Strasburg’s first season back and he’ll be on an innings limit. Bryce Harper and Anthony Rendon will spend at least part of 2012 in the minors. It will be Brad Peacock’s first season in the majors, and he may need to make adjustments. While we may hope for a title run next season if we’re lucky, 2013 looks like the more reasonable target.
To construct a championship-quality team, our goal should be to have above-average regulars at each position and at least four above-average starters. Now, it’s true that most actual World Series champions wind up having below-average regulars at one or two positions. But if we set our goal to be above average at every position, we’ll be better able to handle injuries and slumps that can derail the best laid plans.
Let’s start our tour of positions with the starting pitchers. We often talk about starters as numbers one through five, but those categories can mean different things to different people. For this discussion, I’m going to give these categories concrete definitions.
Imagine ranking the roughly 150 major league starting pitchers. An “average” pitcher would be ranked between number 60 and 90. I want my top four pitchers to be better than average, so I’ll set my target for our number one starter as a pitcher ranked in the top 15. My goal for a number two pitcher would be one ranked from # 16 to 30; for number three, ranked 31 to 45, and for number four, ranked 46 to 60.
To make this even more concrete, I’ll take the 2011 records (through July 9) of all starting pitchers with at least 50 IP and rank them by xFIP (an ERA-like statistic that is fielding independent and is based on strikeouts, walks, and fly balls), a measure that for short periods, like half a season, tends to be a more accurate measure of pitching ability than ERA. With this measure, my target categories break out as follows:
Number one: xFIP < 3.10
Number two: 3.10 < xFIP < 3.43
Number three: 3.43 < xFIP < 3.54
Number four: 3.54 < xFIP < 3.70
Number five: 3.70 < xFIP < 4.05
For 2013, I’ll write in Strasburg as our number one starter. Certainly, if he returns anywhere close to his 2010 form (an xFIP of 2.04 in 68 IP), he’s an easy number one. There obviously are no guarantees (there never are), but the record of pitchers returning from Tommy John surgery is pretty good.
Jordan Zimmermann’s 2011 xFIP (3.70 before Sunday’s start) suggest that he’s the type of pitcher I’m calling a number four starter,* so I’m going to project him in that role for 2013.
*The number four ranking probably seems low after seeing him ranked among this season’s league leaders in ERA. But it’s important to note that he’s had an unusually low rate of home runs per fly ball (2.9%–that is, only four home runs in 140 fly balls). An average pitcher should expect about 10% of fly balls to be homers. It’s true that some pitchers, such as Matt Cain, are able to maintain lower HR/FB rates, and their xFIP statistics will tend to be higher than their actual ERAs. On the other hand: (1) Zimmermann’s HR/FB rate for 2011 is unusually low even compared to pitchers with low HR/FB rates—for example, Cain’s career HR/FB rate is 6.8%, compared to Zim’s 2011 rate of 2.9%, and (2) nothing in Zimmermann’s record before 2011 suggests that he has any special talent for avoiding home runs. Therefore, the most likely interpretation is that Zimmermann’s just been lucky so far this season in his home run rate and will eventually revert to giving up more home runs.
For our number three starter, I’m going to be bold and project Peacock in that role. It’s true that we don’t know yet how he’ll make the adjustment to the majors—maybe the pitches that have tricked Eastern League hitters won’t fool anyone in the majors. Still, when an AA pitcher leads all of the minor leagues in strikeouts and does it with good control, I think there’s a good chance that he has the stuff to be an above-average major league pitcher.
For our number five starter (the league average innings eater) we have several candidates. Interestingly, most of them are lefties. Tom Gorzelanny, John Lannon, and Ross Detwiler will still be under team control. Tom Milone is currently pitching very well in Syracuse, and 2010 draft pick Sammy Solis (currently with Potomac) could advance quickly. My hunch is that Milone will prove to be the best of this group, but really it could be any of them, another prospect, or, if necessary, a one- or two-year rental.
That leaves the number two slot, which is one I think we’ll probably need to fill through a trade or with a free agent. Some examples of pitchers who might fit our criteria for number two starters and who are not committed to their current team beyond 2012 include Erik Bedard, Chris Carpenter, Ryan Dempster, Edwin Jackson, and CJ Wilson. During the 2010–11 off-season, Mike Rizzo’s top priority was obtaining an excellent starting pitcher, and it should continue to be one of his top priorities until the need is filled.
As relief pitchers, we have several live arms under team control through at least 2013—Tyler Clippard, Cole Kimball, Ryan Mattheus, Henry Rodríguez, and Drew Storen. Relief pitchers, of course, are difficult to project, and not all of these young pitchers will be good two years from now. It’s important for the Nats to maintain a continued supply, which can be met through player development, converting less successful starters to the relief role, and making trades and short-term free agent signings. As we learned from the Matt Capps–Wilson Ramos trade, relief pitchers can also serve as great trading chips in filling our other roster needs.
In my next post, I’ll look at the position players.
On June 22, the Nats reached .500. The next morning I posted an item on their odds of reaching the playoffs.* According to coolstandings.com, their odds of reaching the playoffs then stood at 18.5%.
* With a bigger story breaking later that day, it’s not surprising that my post didn’t get much attention.
Since then, the team has maintained its .500 pace, going 8–8. One might think that their playoff odds should be about the same. In fact, according to the same site, they’ve plummeted to 5.3%.
It’s not hard to see what happened. The morning of June 23, Washington was 37–37, five games behind Atlanta (43–33) in the wild-card race. Since then, the Nats continued to play .500 ball, while the Braves have gone 10–4, with their lead over the Nats in the wild-card race widening to eight games.
Looking ahead, if the Braves were to cool off, the Nats would still have to hope that none of the other teams that are currently ahead of them (the D’backs, Pirates, Cardinals and Mets) get hot in their place. Over the last three seasons, the NL wild-card winner has averaged 91 wins. For the Nats, reaching that target would require them to go 46–26 the rest of the way—not impossible, but obviously very unlikely.
For a team that’s behind in a wild-card race, staying in the race doesn’t mean staying the same, it means getting a lot better. Staying the same means falling further behind.
What’s true for a pennant race is even more true for the more important, longer run race that the Nationals are engaged in—the race to become a truly competitive franchise in the National League East. The Nationals have some great prospects, but so do the Phillies and, especially, the Braves. Improving the franchise means continuing to sign and develop great prospects, making good trades, and making smart decisions about signing free agents.
As we approach the trading season, it’s important that Mike Rizzo and company not be distracted by the small chance of a wild-card run this season. They instead should be focused on the more important goal of making this a truly competitive franchise within the next two or three years. Where worthwhile value can be obtained in return, we should be trading the players who aren’t necessarily part of that future, players like Jason Marquis, Laynce Nix, and Sean Burnett. We want to build a team that can not only be competitive, but can sustain that status for multiple seasons. That requires adding good prospects. While our farm system has improved, it’s not yet an elite one.
In my next post, I’ll share some thoughts about my vision for the team’s future.
I spent some time at baseball-reference.com looking at the Nationals’ team batting and pitching splits. Trying to focus on the splits that are relevant to evaluating the team’s strengths and weaknesses, here are ten things that I learned:
1. The Nats have hit better than average at two positions—second base and left field.
Nats second basemen (96% Danny Espinosa) rank fifth among major league teams and second in the NL (behind only Milwaukee) with an OPS of .777, which compares to the major league average for second basemen of .688.
Nats left fielders rank fourth in the majors and third in the NL (behind St. Louis and Milwaukee) with an OPS of .803, which compares to the Major League Baseball average for left fielders of .721. Obviously, this mostly comes from Laynce Nix, with his OPS of .928 while playing LF. Somewhat surprisingly, Jerry Hairston, Jr. also contributed to this split with an OPS of 1.055 in his 40 plate appearances as a left fielder.
2. The Nats first basemen have been average in hitting. The team has had below-average hitting at the other positions, with their worst performance coming at shortstop.
Nationals shortstops (90% Ian Desmond) rank 28th of the 30 teams in MLB and 15th in the NL (ahead of only Cincinnati) with an OPS of .576, which compares to the MLB average for shortstops of .693. Our catchers rank 18th, first basemen 14th, third basemen 24th, center fielders 27th, and right fielders 23rd.
3. Nats pitchers, when hitting, have been below average.
Our pitchers rank 13th in the NL in hitting with an OPS of .278, which compares to the MLB average for pitchers of .334. This one actually surprised me, since three of our starters—Liván Hernández, Jason Marquis, and Jordan Zimmermann—are pretty good hitters. The problem is that our southpaw pitchers—John Lannan and Tom Gorzelanny—have been awful; they are hitless in 51 combined at bats.
4. Our leadoff hitters have been atrocious.
Nats leadoff hitters have been by far the worst in MLB, with an OBP of .267 (the next worst is Oakland with .297) and an OPS of .570 (the next worst are the White Sox with .612). In comparison, the average MLB leadoff hitter has an OBP of .328 and OPS of .718. Literally everyone that the Nats have tried leading off has been awful there—Jayson Werth’s OPS in the leadoff spot is .587, Roger Bernadina’s is .585, Espinosa’s is .579, and Desmond’s is .512.
A perhaps even more amazingly awful split is that the Nats’ first batter in the game has an OBP of .188 and an OPS of .405—both statistics easily the worst in baseball, far below the MLB averages of .317 and .699. Given the Nats’ leadoff woes, it’s not surprising that they have scored only 28 runs in the first inning (tied for 26th among MLB teams).
5. The Nats have also been below average in production from the # 2, 3, and 4 spots in the batting order.
Our # 2 hitters (most often, Desmond) have an OPS of .620, ranking 25th. Our # 3 hitters (most often, Werth) have an OPS of .716, ranking 21st. Our # 4 cleanup hitters (a mix of Adam LaRoche, Nix, and Michael Morse) have an OPS of .705, ranking 24th.
6. The Nats have gotten above-average production from their # 5, 6, and 7 hitters.
Our # 5 hitters (mostly Morse and Wilson Ramos) have an OPS of .777, which ranks 11th. Our # 6 hitters (most often Espinosa) have an OPS of .798, ranking sixth. Our # 7 hitters (a mix of Hairston, Iván Rodríguez, Ramos and Espinosa) have an OPS of .759, ranking third. The Nats have scored 42 runs in the second inning, ranking ninth.
7. Nats batters have hit well in high leverage situations.
In situations with a leverage index above 1.5 (these represent about 20% of all plate appearances and generally occur in the late innings of close games, especially with runners on base) the Nats’ OPS is .742, well above the MLB average of .711 and ranking seventh among MLB teams. The Nats have especially raked in extra innings, where they have an OPS .984 (ranking second, behind only the Dodgers).
8. The Nats have hit well against power pitchers.
Their OPS against power pitchers (pitchers who are among the top third in strikeouts plus walks) is .696, which ranks ninth and compares to the MLB average of .667. In view of the Nats’ proclivity to strike out, I found this split to be a bit surprising, but the extra Ks seem to have been counterbalanced by their home run abilities.
9. If the other team hits it on the ground, they’re probably out.
The Nats infielders have converted 79.0% of ground balls to outs—second best in the majors (behind only Seattle)—which compares to 76.8% for the average major league team. Their opponents’ OPS on ground balls in play is just .434, compared to the MLB average of .484.
10. Nats pitching in high leverage situations has been exceptional.
The Nats have held opposing hitters to a .640 OPS in high leverage plate appearances, which ranks seventh best in the majors and compares to an MLB average of .711. The Nats pitchers have held opposing hitters to a .579 OPS in the ninth inning, compared to an MLB average of .667, and to a .656 OPS in extra-inning games, compared to an MLB average of .741.
Nats Noodles 