The Nats began September in the doldrums, going 2–5 and losing series to the Braves, Mets, and Dodgers in succession. They reached their low point on September 8 after Drew Storen entered a tie game against the Dodgers in the top of the ninth and giving up three runs for the loss. As a rainstorm forced the cancellation of the second game of the doubleheader, the Nats’ record stood at 65–76 (.461).
Then the Nats’ bats woke up and their young pitchers turned in several outstanding performances. They went 15—5 down the stretch, taking five of their last six series—including four-game sweeps of both the Mets and the Phillies. They ended the season with a victory over the Marlins on a 10-strikeout, one-hit masterpiece from Stephen Strasburg.
Except where noted, all statistics are for the month of September only.
Record:
17–10 (.630) for September, ending the season at 80–81 (.497).
Pythagorean Record:
15–12 (4.07 R/G – 3.52 RA/G).
MVP for September:
Ian Desmond (.302/.331/.448, 27 G, 122 PA, 4 HR, 16 R, 12 RBI, 120 wRC+, 0.9 fWAR, .64 WPA, 5.56 RE24). His playing time and clutch performance allowed him to edge out an excellent performance by Wilson Ramos (.358/.434/.582).
Most valuable starting pitcher:
Stephen Strasburg (1–1, 1.88 R/9, 5 G, 24 IP, 9.0 K/9, 0.8 BB/9), with honorable mention going to Brad Peacock (2–0, 0.75 R/9, 12 IP).
Most valuable reliever:
Craig Stammen (1-0, 0.00 R/9, 5 G, 8-1/3 IP, 10.8 K/9, 3.2 BB/9, 0.0 HR/9, 0.48 WHIP, 1 of 6 inherited runners scored, 4 shutdowns, 0 meltdown).
Best start this month:
Stephen Strasburg (September 28, 3–1 win over the Marlins in Miami, 6 innings, 1 H, 0 R, 2 BB, 10 SO, Game score of 78).
Worst start:
John Lannan (September 10, 9–3 loss to Houston at home, 2-1/3 IP, 8 H, 6 R, 1 BB, 1 SO, Game score of 21).
Best shutdown:
Tyler Clippard (September 9, 4–3 win over Houston at home). Clip pitched the 10th and 11th innings of a 3–3 tie, allowing only one batter to reach on a two-out single in the 11th, and striking out two. When the Nats scored the winning run on a throwing error in the bottom of the 11th, Clippard was credited with the win. (Win probability added .246)
Worst meltdown:
Drew Storen (September 8, 7–4 loss to Los Angeles at home). Entering in the top of the ninth of a 4–4 tie, Storen allowed three runs to score on two singles, a double, a walk, a hit batter, and a stolen base, before Collin Balester was called in to get the final out. (WPA –.472)
Clutch hit:
Michael Morse (September 26, 6–4 win over the Marlins in Miami). The Nats were behind 4–3 and down to their final out in the top of the ninth, with runners on second and third. Morse got hold of a 1–1 splitter and Bob Carpenter got to say, “see you later.” (WPA .731).
Choke:
Michael Morse (September 17, 4–1 loss to the Marlins at home). The bottom of the 11th, the score was tied 1–1, one out, and there were runners on first and third. Morse grounded into a double play to end the inning. (WPA –.317). The Marlins scored three in the top of the 13th to win it.
If you’ve read this blog, you know that I support the sabermetric approach to analysis and am not averse to citing numbers like WAR (wins above replacement) and WPA (win probability added). Nevertheless, many of the numbers available at sites like fangraphs.com and baseball-reference.com remain a sort of alphabet soup to me. So it’s fun to discover that one of the numbers I hadn’t paid much attention to can really tell me a lot.
The number I’m excited about right now is called “RE24.” For evaluating relief pitchers, it works a lot better than ERA (we know that ERA can often be pretty meaningless for relievers). And the statistic also works for batters, giving us information about situational hitting and clutch performance that is omitted from popular statistics like WAR and wOBA.
What is RE24? In a way, it’s kind of similar to WPA, except it’s measuring runs instead of wins. Let me explain.
The calculation of WPA begins by assuming that each team, on average, begins a game with a probability of winning of 50%. (Yes, in any individual game the probabilities will be more or less than 50%, but if we take the average across all games and teams it has to be 50%.) Each event during the game then raises or lowers the win probability, and WPA simply assigns the change in win probability of these events to the batter (offense) or pitcher (defense) and then adds them up. At the end of the game, the total WPA for the players on the winning team always equals +.50 (their probability of winning has gone from 0.50 to 1.00) and the total WPA for the players on the losing team always equals –.50.
RE24 applies the same type of calculation to the changes in expected runs. Major League Baseball teams are averaging 4.3 runs per game, or about .48 runs per inning. So each inning starts with +.48 runs expected and ends with zero runs expected (after the third out is recorded).
As an example, let’s look at the third inning of Thursday’s game against Philadelphia. Rick Ankiel led off with a double. With a runner on second and no outs, a team can expect to score about 1.10 runs; the increase in expected runs (.62 = 1.10 – .48) was credited to Rick Ankiel as his RE24. Next, Jesús Flores struck out; there were .44 fewer runs expected with a runner on second and one out than with nobody out, so his RE24 was –.44. Brad Peacock then grounded out, advancing Ankiel to third. There were .31 fewer expected runs with a runner on third and two outs than with a runner on second and one out, so Peacock was charged with –.31 RE24. Ian Desmond doubled, scoring Ankiel, and Desmond was credited with .96 RE24 (1.00 for the run scored minus .04 because he ended up on second, whereas Ankiel had been on third). Roger Bernadina singled, scoring Desmond (+.91 RE24). Bernadina then stole second, giving him an additional +.09 RE24. At this point, with a runner on second and two outs, there were .32 expected runs. Finally, Ryan Zimmerman flied out to end the inning and was charged with –.32 RE24.
RE24 versus WPA
RE24 sounds quite a bit like WPA – so what does it tell us that WPA doesn’t? The key difference is that RE24 treats all innings and runs the same, whereas WPA gives more weight to events occurring in “high leverage” situations, such as in the late innings of close games. While that helps WPA as a “story” statistic—it can immediately tell you whether a hit or an out came with the game on the line—it also can cause it to work poorly for telling us the value of an event. That’s because we can’t really tell how important a run will turn out to be at the time that it is being scored (or prevented).
For example, if a team wins 4–3, scoring three runs in the second inning and the tie-breaking winning run in the ninth, which run was most valuable? I’d argue that they were all equally valuable because ultimately the team needed all four runs to win. At the time it was scored, the last run felt especially valuable because time was running out, but the reality is that all four runs were equally necessary. When Zimmerman hit his walk-off grand slam against the Phillies, capping a 6-run ninth inning, the Nats’ relief pitchers (Tom Gorzelanny, Sean Burnett, and Todd Coffey) were the unsung heroes; if they hadn’t kept the game within reach, the offense’s ninth inning heroics might have been for naught. But WPA doesn’t recognize the ultimate importance of their low leverage innings, whereas RE24 gives them full credit for holding the Phillies scoreless. (The movie Moneyball highlights another great game where runs that didn’t seem important at the time turned out to be critical.)
So my take is that while both RE24 and WPA have their uses, RE24 generally does better at measuring the value of a player’s overall situational performance, whereas WPA reveals something about how a player performs in situations where the game is known to be on the line.
RE24 for pitchers
For pitchers, ERA already captures quite a bit of situational performance. For example, if Ross Detwiler loads the bases with no outs and manages to work his way out of the jam without giving up a run, his ERA credits him with the scoreless inning.
ERA sometimes breaks down. The biggest problem is with relief pitchers. One of the most important responsibilities of a relief pitcher is to prevent inherited runners from scoring, yet a relief pitcher’s ERA is unaffected by whether he prevents or allows inherited runners to score. Ironically, when a pitcher leaves the game with runners aboard, his performance is judged by events that occur after he’s in the dugout. Because RE24 allows partial credit for preventing or allowing runs, it can appropriately split the responsibility for inherited runners between the pitcher who left them on and the pitcher who allows them to score (or prevents them from doing so).
The other difference is that RE24 tracks all runs, not just unearned runs. Sabermetricians have long complained that ERA, by removing unearned runs, doesn’t really adjust for fielding and can lead to a misleading measure of pitcher performance, since the unearned run rates vary systematically among pitchers. (Groundball pitchers tend to allow more unearned runs, whereas strikeout or flyball tend to allow fewer unearned runs. So ERA tends to overstate the performance of groundball pitchers like Chien-Ming Wang and John Lannan relative to simple R/9.)
RE24 is measured as positive or negative deviations from MLB average, so to be able to directly compare it to ERA, we need to add back in the MLB-average runs. For Stephen Strasburg for example, multiply his innings pitched (18) times the league average runs per game, (4.28/9), then subtract his RE24 (3.52) to give a number (5.04) that’s directly comparable to his runs allowed (5). But this is on a scale of R/9 rather than ERA, so to convert it to an ERA scale I multiply by the MLB ratio of ERA to R/9 (3.94/4.28). Finally, we divide by Strasburg’s IP and multiply by 9, giving us an “RE24 average” of 2.32, which can be compared directly to his ERA of 2.00.
Comparing the RE24 averages of the Nats pitchers to their ERAs, we see that some pitchers do quite a bit better (Tyler Clippard‘s RE24 average is 1.19, compared to his ERA of 1.88), while others do much worse (Doug Slaten‘s RE24 average is 9.56 compared to his ERA of 4.02). Burnett and Henry Rodríguez also did more poorly with RE24, while Coffey did better. In general, these differences reflect the pitcher’s performance with inherited runners. Among starters, Wang did especially poorly (4.68 versus his ERA of 4.04), reflecting a large number of unearned runs allowed.
RE24 for batters
For batters, measures like wOBA and WAR are based on averages for various types of hits (singles, doubles, triples, home runs, walks, etc.) and generally aren’t affected by situational hitting, such as batting performance with runners in scoring position or grounding into double plays. For a measure of player value, you might want to include situational performance, but there are so many situations to consider that doing so systematically may seem daunting.
Fortunately, RE24 does these calculations automatically for all possible base-out situations. To see whether a batter performs better or worse than expected based on the situations he faces, we can simply compare his RE24 to his WRAA. (WRAA, or “weighted runs above average” converts a batter’s wOBA to runs above average, so it’s on the same scale as RE24.)
For example, Wilson Ramos has an RE24 (–7.01 through Saturday’s game) that’s 12½ runs below his WRAA, which reflects his overall poor splits with runners on base or in scoring positions. Jayson Werth also has a poor RE24 relative to his WRAA, while, on the positive side of the ledger, Danny Espinosa, Laynce Nix, Iván Rodríguez, and Ankiel all have RE24 stats that are stronger than their WRAA.
Warnings
The main caveat with RE24 is that it always attributes everything that happens with an in-play event to the batter and the pitcher. Of course, fielders and baserunners often matter a lot to what happens, so for individual plays RE24 can be a fairly crude measure. As a consequence, I generally wouldn’t take the full difference between RE24 and WRAA, for example, as a measure of a batter’s situational performance, since some of the difference may also be attributable to baserunners or fielders.
Even with this caution, I’m finding that RE24 is a very powerful tool for looking at questions such as post-season awards, where I’d like to take account of situational performance in a systematic way.
lizroscher of The Good Phight writes:
The Nationals went from a team I pitied to a team I despise pretty quickly. Their players won’t stop yakking about how good they’re about to be. Davey Johnson always looks like he’s someone’s lost grandpa. John Lannan can’t stop throwing pitches at the Phillies. And then there’s Danny Espinosa. Espinosa, who is a .238 hitter in 2011, has turned into a Phillie Killer. In 17 games against the Phillies, he’s 20-for-59 with three doubles, six walks, and 15 RBI. Espinosa has seven home runs against the Phillies. Seven. His total for the year? 21. A full 1/3 of his home runs have come against the Phillies. That’s insane, especially because Danny Espinosa is not a good baseball player.
I hate Danny Espinosa…
I’m not kidding, Danny Espinosa makes me physically ill.
63 years ago today, September 20, 1948, Washington won its last pennant. They claimed the pennant by beating Baltimore three games to one in a best-of-five league championship series that was tainted by controversy. Washington’s veteran Hall-of-Fame first baseman led the league in batting average and tied for the league lead in home runs with his teammate in left field—who was one of the great power hitters of the era and also led the league in RBIs.
Readers who know a little baseball history are objecting now, noting that my lead paragraph appears to be inconsistent with one or more of the following facts: The Cleveland Indians won the 1948 American League pennant. The old Washington Senators’ last pennant came in 1933. The St. Louis Browns didn’t relocate to Baltimore until 1954. And the MLB league championship series didn’t begin until 1969.
On the other hand, readers who know a little more baseball history realize that in 1948 most African American players still played in separate, segregated leagues with their own pennants and World Series. In 1948, Washigton’s Negro league team*, the Homestead Grays, won the final pennant race of the Negro National League and went on to play in the last Negro League World Series. Buck Leonard was their Hall-of-Fame first baseman and Luke Easter was their power-hitting left fielder.
* There is some confusion out there about whether the Homestead Grays really were a Washington team. The Grays began in 1910 as a “sandlot” or recreational team for black steelworkers in Homestead, Pennsylvania (near Pittsburgh). By the 1920s the Grays were fully professional, at first as an independent team (not affiliated with the formal Negro leagues) playing in the Pittsburgh area, and later, beginning in 1929, as a member of one of the major Negro leagues. During the 1930s they played their home games at Greenlee Field or Forbes Field in Pittsburgh. Beginning in 1940, the Grays began playing about half of their home games in Washington at Griffith Stadium. When playing in Washington, they wore a “W” on the sleeve of the home uniforms, and when playing in Pittsburgh they wore an “H.” The Grays were soon drawing more fans per game than the Senators, and by 1943 the Grays were playing two-thirds of their home games in Washington. While they continued to claim both Washington and Pittsburgh as homes, during the mid-to-late 1940s Washington was recognized as their primary home. For example, contemporary articles about the 1948 league championship in the Baltimore Afro American refer to Griffith Stadium as the Grays’ home field and refer to their players as “the Washingtonians.” For more information on the Homestead Grays in Washington, see Beyond the Shadow of the Senators by Brad Snyder.
By 1948, the Negro leagues were dying. While integration of the major leagues was moving forward at a glacial pace, black baseball fans had abruptly shifted their attention from the old Negro leagues to the newly integrated majors. At the end of the 1948 season, nearly three years after Branch Rickey announced the signing of Jackie Robinson, there were still only four black players in the majors—Robinson and Roy Campanella with the Brooklyn Dodgers, and Larry Doby and Satchel Paige with the Cleveland Indians. It would take more than another decade for baseball to become fully integrated. But the sports sections of black newspapers had already shifted their coverage to tracking in detail the performance of these new stars of integrated baseball. Negro league games, even including playoffs and World Series, were now relegated to short articles at the bottom of the page. As was the case with other Negro league teams, attendance at Grays’ games dropped off dramatically. Instead, the black fans crowded into a sold-out Griffith Stadium whenever the Indians, with Doby and Paige, came to town.
The 1948 Grays were not the same team that had dominated the Negro National League from 1937 to 1945. Josh Gibson was dead; Cool Papa Bell and Jud Wilson were retired; Ray Brown had been banned from the league for jumping to the Mexican League. Of their old stars, only Leonard and long-time shortstop Sam Bankhead remained. In addition to Leonard, Easter, and Bankhead, other notable 1948 Grays players included Puerto Rican center fielder Luis Márquez, pitcher / third baseman Wilmer Fields, and right fielder Bob Thurman.
Their opponents in the league championship playoff, the Baltimore Elite Giants, featured a team built more around speed than power. Their leadoff hitter and second baseman, 19-year old Junior Gilliam, would go on to win the National League Rookie of the Year Award in 1953 and have a 14-year career with the Dodgers. (I’m old enough that I remember watching Gilliam play with the 1960s-era Dodgers.) Pitcher Joe Black would also play for the Dodgers and win the Rookie of the Year Award in 1952. Veteran pitcher Bill Byrd had pitched five times in Negro League (“East-West”) All-Star Games.
Because Griffith Stadium was unavailable, the entire best-of-five series was to be played at Bugle Field in Baltimore. The first game was played on Tuesday, September 14. The Grays’ Tom Parker pitched a shutout and won 6–0, with Easter driving in four runs on a home run and a triple and Leonard driving in the other two on a bases-loaded single. In game two on Thursday, the Grays took a 5–3 victory behind the pitching of Garnett Blair, who must have had a sore arm, since he was described by the Baltimore Afro American as a “lame armed pitcher.”
Friday’s game three would end in controversy. The city of Baltimore had a curfew that prevented night games from continuing past 11:15. (Apparently the night games began at 8:30, which seems surprisingly late.) At 10:52, the teams were tied 4–4 after 8 innings, and the managers met with the umpires to discuss the possibiity of calling the game as a tie. The rules of that era apparently did not include a provision for completing a game the next day—they were following the same rules that would apply if a game were called early for rain. The umpire thought there should be enough time to finish another inning and ordered the teams to play on. Baltimore brought in relief pitcher Jonas Gaines for the top of the ninth, and he quickly gave up four singles and two walks. After falling a couple runs behind, Baltimore decided that their best chance would be to delay the game so that the inning wouldn’t be completed before the curfew, forcing the score to revert to a tie. So they stalled and “were making no effort to get the side out.” When the umpire finally called the game, the score was 8–4 and the Grays had the bases loaded with two outs. The Elites’ strategy appeared to have worked, as the score reverted to 4–4 and the game was called as a tie.
After protesting in vain to the umpire, Sonnyman Jackson, the Grays’ president, called the league president, John L. Johnson, in New York. Johnson overturned the umpire’s decision and ordered the remainder of Friday’s game to be played from the point where it ended. The Elite Giants’ president, Vernon Green, was notified of the decision shortly before game four was scheduled to start on Sunday afternoon. He objected strenuously, and went ahead with the scheduled game without making any announcement to the crowd. Baltimore won the game, 11–3. After the game, as the fans were leaving the stadium still unaware of the league president’s decision about game three, the Grays’ baserunners returned to the bases they had left Friday night and waited for the umpires to order the completion of the unfinished game. But the Elite Giants returned to their clubhouse, and the umpires also ignored them, so eventually the Grays left the field.
Johnson agreed to come to Baltimore on Monday, September 20, and hold a hearing on the issue. He then reiterated his decision that the game should resume from the point where it ended. Green decided to forfeit the game instead, saying he would not open Bugle Field and ask local fans to come out to see a half inning of a title game followed by an exhibition game. So it turned out that the Grays’ final pennant was awarded in a hotel room by men wearing suits.
While I’m somewhat sympathetic to Johnson’s decision given the unsportsmanlike strategy that the Elite Giants were employing to stall the game, I don’t think his decision can actually be justified by the baseball rules that were in effect at the time. Sportswriter Sam Lacy of the Baltimore Afro American wrote a column ranting about the illegality of the league president’s decision.
In a subsequent article we’ll tell the story of the Grays’ final World Series.
References
For general background on the Homestead Grays during their Washington years, see Brad Snyder, Beyond the Shadow of the Senators: The Untold Story of the Homestead Grays and the Integration of Baseball, Contemporary Books, 2003.
For background on the process of integration and its effects on black baseball, see Jules Tygiel, Baseball’s Great Experiment: Jackie Robinson and His Legacy, Oxford University Press, 1983.
I pulled accounts of the NNL championship series from contemporary newspaper articles appearing in the Baltimore Afro American, which is available for free from Google News; for example, see the September 18 issue.
After Stephen Strasburg‘s first start back from Tommy John surgery on Tuesday, there were several interesting articles describing how he has changed as a pitcher. For example, Tom Boswell of The Washington Post quoted Strasburg:
I’m really trying to be a pitcher out there, not just light up the radar gun every time… Guys don’t want to get to two strikes against me, so if you make quality pitches early in the count, you can get quick outs… I think my command of my fastball is better than it was before… because I don’t try to dial it up every time.
Boswell then added:
If all this sounds familiar, it should. It’s the same theory of better efficiency that made Jordan Zimmermann so much better this season… For one night, almost everything Strasburg set as goals for himself for the past year — better efficiency and lots of soft contact rather than long-at-bat strikeouts — was on display instantly.
Boswell’s colleague at the Post, Adam Kilgore, spelled out some of the differences:
Rather than throwing his fastball at 98 and 99 miles per hour, the Nationals and Strasburg have decided he is better served throwing 96 and 97… He averaged only 11.2 pitches per inning, lower than any of his starts in 2010. He averaged about 96.7 miles per hour with his four-seam fastball and 95.1 with his two-seamer. He focused not on striking out Dodgers hitters, but on inducing weak contact. He struck out four of the 17 hitters he faced.
Jeff Zimmerman of Fangraphs did a PitchFX analysis of his first start and found that Strasburg’s fastball speeds were about 1 mph slower than last year’s. He also notes that his changeup has a new spin and breaks down less than before.
It appears that the Nationals strategy for Strasburg aims for:
- Lower velocity
- Fewer pitches per batter
- Fewer strikeouts and walks
- Weak contact
- More balls in play
- With the result of longer outings and more innings pitched per start.
Is this approach likely to succeed? There are some parts of this question I’m really not equipped to answer, such as whether pitching to contact may reduce his risk for injury. But sabermetrics does provide tools that allow us to address the narrower question of whether pitching to contact can allow Strasburg to work deeper into games.
The math of working deeper
There are three ways for a pitcher to work deeper into games: he can throw more pitches per game, he can throw fewer pitches per batter, or he can see fewer batters per out. Presumably, the Nats aren’t planning to have Strasburg throw many more pitches per game, so their approach will focus on the latter two.
There’s a close relationship between strikeout rates, walk rates, and the number of pitches thrown per batter. I ran a linear regression on all starting pitchers with at least 60 IP during 2008–10 that gave the following equation relating pitches per batter faced to walk rate (walks per batter faced) and strikeout rate (strikeouts per batter faced):
Pitches/BF = 3.19 + 3.4 * walk rate + 1.9 * strikeout rate. (R^2 = .52, n = 274)
For example, if pitcher A has a walk rate that’s 5 percentage points lower than pitcher B and a strikeout rate that’s 10 percentage points lower, he’s likely to throw 3.4*.05 + 1.9*.10 = .36 fewer pitches per batter. So a pitcher can throw fewer pitches per batter by getting earlier contact and fewer walks and strikeouts.
The main way a pitcher can see fewer batters per out is to lower his opponents’ on-base average. Reducing the walk rate is a very effective way to lower the on-base average. On the other hand, reducing the strikeout rate will, all else equal, tend to raise the opponents’ on-base average. On-base average can also be reduced if the pitcher can lower the opponents’ batting average on balls in play.
An example: Jordan Zimmermann
Boswell mentions the changes that Jordan Zimmermann has made this season as a prototype for what the Nats would like Strasburg to do. How has Zimmermann changed?
Comparing his season in 2009 before the Tommy John surgery with his 2011 season, we first note that he isn’t throwing more pitches—in fact, his pitches per game dropped slightly, from 98.4 to 94.8. He did reduce his strikeout rate (from 23.5% to 18.7%) and his walk rate (from 7.4% to 4.7%), and raised his contact rate. Along with getting fewer strikeouts and walks, he’s reduced his pitches per batter from 4.03 to 3.72, a little bit larger reduction than predicted by the formula shown above. By throwing fewer pitches per batter, he’s been able to pitch to about one more batter per game (an increase from 24.4 to 25.5). Finally, his reduction in walks along with drops in home runs given up and in opponents’ batting average on balls in play (from .339 to .296) has allowed him to reduce his opponents’ on-base percentage (from .332 to .294) in spite of the reduction in strikeouts. The net effect—he’s increased his average outing from 5.71 innings to 6.21 innings, or about two additional outs per game. The results on his performance also appear to be excellent, with his ERA dropping from 4.63 to 3.18.
It sounds like a resounding success for the “pitch to contact” philosophy, but there are some caveats. Comparing his batting average on balls in play for the two seasons, it’s 2009 (.339) that’s unusually high, while 2011 (.296) is quite close to the league average (.294). We normally expect pitchers with high BABIP to revert toward more average numbers, so that part of JZim’s improvement would have been predicted regardless of any change in pitching style.
Furthermore, other than getting fewer home runs per fly ball, JZim’s batted ball statistics don’t necessarily indicate that his batted balls were getting weaker contact. His ground ball rate was lower in 2011 than 2009, as was his infield fly rate. On the other hand, his line drive rate was lower.
We also think that there tends to be a large “luck” component to home runs per fly ball; JZim’s rate of 5.9% is sixth lowest in baseball and will probably revert to a higher level. Two sabermetric measures that remove these components of luck (FIP, which removes BABIP, and xFIP, which also removes the effects of home runs not accounted for by fly ball/ground ball rates) show much less improvement than his ERA—indeed, his xFIP was actually higher in 2011 than in 2009 (3.77 versus 3.35). These statistics raise questions about how much of his improvement in performance can be attributed to his new pitching style.
Nevertheless, the advanced metrics still show JZim to be an above average pitcher (his FIP for 2011 is 3.16, or very close to his ERA, while his xFIP is higher at 3.77), and he is successfully pitching deeper into games than he did before his surgery.
The case of Justin Verlander
Kilgore mentions the improvements made by Justin Verlander this season as another prototype for Strasburg’s pitch-to-contact approach. Indeed, in 2010 Dave Cameron of Fangraphs discussed Verlander as an example of a pitcher whose value was limited by his inability to go deep into games.
This season, Verlander has not only been much more successful, but he has pitched deeper into games, averaging 7.39 innings per game compared to 6.80 last season. But looking at the details, it’s not clear that his new approach can be described as pitching to contact. While he’s lowered his walk rate from 7.7% in 2010 to 5.8% this season, he’s also raised his strikeout rate (from 23.7% to 26.3%), so his contact rate has actually been essentially unchanged. Similarly, his pitches per batter (4.05 last season, 4.08 this season) have hardly changed. What has changed, besides the improvement in both strikeouts and walks, is his opponents’ batting average on balls in play, which fell from .289 to an almost absurdly low .236, with a corresponding drop in on-base percentage from .291 to .240. Setting aside the question of whether such rates are sustainable, the bottom line seems to be that he’s pitching deeper into games because he’s getting more batters out. That’s great, but if there’s a secret formula for doing that, every pitcher in the world would want to copy it.
My takeaway from looking at Verlander is that he’s pitched great, but I don’t see his performance as especially relevant for evaluating the Nationals’ pitch-to-contact philosophy.
What to expect from Strasburg
Of course, it’s foolhardy to extrapolate from one pitcher’s experience to another’s. Nevertheless, Zimmermann’s experience does provide one example of what might happen with Strasburg if he continues to pursue the pitch-to-contact philosophy. So I thought it would be interesting to build a scenario for Stephen based in part on JZim’s experience.
For this scenario, I’m going to make the following assumptions for 2012:
- Strasburg’s strikeout rate drops (relative to his 2010 rate) by the same proportion that JZim’s rate dropped from 2009 to 2011 (20%). In other words, his strikeout rate would drop from 33.6% to 26.7%.
- Similarly, his walk rate drops by the same proportion that JZim’s did (37%). That is, his walk rate would drop from 6.2% to 3.9%.
- All of his other statistics (such as hits, home runs, etc.) revert to the major league average rates excluding walks and strikeouts. (For example, Strasburg’s BABIP in 2010 was .319; it would drop to the major league average, which is .294.) Because Strasburg’s 2010 rates for in-play events were generally close to the league average anyway, and these rates should be heavily regressed for small samples, this seems like the best projection for these components.
- For playing time, I’ll assume that he gets the same number of starts that JZim had this season (26) and averages the same number of pitches per game that JZim threw (94.8). Note that Strasburg averaged only 89.4 pitches per game in 2010, so this is assuming an increase in pitches per game of 6%.
- I use the regression coefficients that appear above to calculate the change in pitches per batter.
- Finally, I’ll use the “Base Runs” formula to project the results of these assumptions.
Based on these assumptions, Strasburg does pitch deeper into games, facing an average of 25.6 batters, compared to 22.8 in 2010. About half of this change comes from throwing more pitches per game, the other half from lowering his pitches per batter from 3.92 to 3.71. His opponents’ on-base percentage stays about the same (.265 versus .268 in 2010) as the reductions in walks and in BABIP offset the reduction in strikeouts. Consequently, his average innings pitched per game increases from 5.67 to 6.46, or a little more than two additional outs per game. Again, about half of this increase comes from assuming more pitches per game.
His opponents’ batting average would increase from .221 to .230 because the effects of fewer strikeouts more than offsets the assumed drop in BABIP. His runs allowed per 9 innings is projected at 3.11, compared to 3.31 for 2010.
All in all, this looks like a good move – a slightly better projected performance per inning and averaging about a 14% longer outing per start. What might go wrong? The assumption that he lowers his walk rate by 37% is awfully strong. If, for example, his walk rate didn’t change at all, he’d be left with the negative effects of a lower strikeout rate with no offsetting improvement in walks, hurting his performance.
If we assume that his average pitches per game would have increased to JZim’s level even without the new pitch-to-contact approach, we’re left with relatively modest improvements in performance and length of starts that could disappear entirely if the improvements in control aren’t realized. Is it worth the risk to make this change?
If it were only the numbers I’ve been calculating, I’d probably not tinker with Strasburg’s approach. But Kilgore mentioned another consideration, that the Nationals believe Strasburg’s new approach will reduce the risk of injury. I don’t know whether there’s evidence for this view, but it seems plausible that throwing with a little less velocity could lessen the impact of pitching on the arm. If pitching to contact can keep Strasburg healthy, I’m all in favor.
Last winter, in looking ahead to this season’s Nats, I thought I’d see a team that would feature good offense from the heart of the order and weak bats from the rest of the lineup, along with undistinguished, but passable pitching. In August, the team that I had imagined finally appeared.
Except where noted, all statistics are for the month of August only.
Record:
12–15 (.444) for August – ending the month at 63–71 (.470) for the season.
Pythagorean Record:
12–15 (3.74 R/G – 4.26 RA/G).
MVP for August:
Ryan Zimmerman (.333/.377/.562, 27 G, 114 PA, 5 HR, 15 R, 17 RBI, 155 wRC+, 1.2 fWAR). His defense allowed him to edge out Michael Morse (.333/.405/.606).
Most valuable starting pitcher:
None of the Nats’ starters had a really good month. I’m going to give the award to Jordan Zimmermann (2–2, 3.45 ERA, 5 G, 28-2/3 IP, 8.2 K/9, 2.8 BB/9), even though he was fourth on the team in ERA for August. In this case, however, it’s illustrative of a problem with ERA—in August, 22.6% of the runs allowed by the Nats (26 of 115) were unearned. (In contrast, the major league average this season is 8.5% of all runs are unearned.) Unearned runs are not entirely the responsibility of fielders—pitchers bear at least some of the responsibility for allowing the baserunners to continue to advance and score and should be held responsible (at least in part) for unearned runs. If we look at (total) run average (including the unearned runs), Zimmermann led the staff – he also led in some of the sabermetric stats like “RE24”. So he gets the award again this month. On the other hand, his August performance was nowhere near what he did in May and June.
Most valuable reliever:
Todd Coffey (1-0, 3.38 ERA, 12 G, 10-2/3 IP, 6.8 K/9, 0.8 BB/9, 0.8 HR/9, 0.56 WHIP, 0 of 4 inherited runners scored, 3 shutdowns, 0 meltdown). Tom Gorzelanny (1.80, 2 shutdowns, 1 meltdown) also received consideration; his 3-inning shutdown of the Phillies in the August 19 game that the Nats came back to win on Zim’s grand slam was especially notable.
Best start this month:
Chien-Ming Wang (August 9, 3–1 win over the Chicago Cubs in Chicago, 6 innings, 1 H, 0 R, 2 BB, 1 SO, Game score of 69).
Worst start:
Liván Hernández (August 6, 15–7 loss to Colorado in Denver, 3-2/3 IP, 9 H, 9 R, 7 ER, 0 BB, 0 SO, 2 HR, Game score of 11).
Best shutdown:
Tyler Clippard (August 5, 5–3 win over the Rockies in Denver). Clip was called in with the bases loaded and two outs in the bottom of the sixth with the Nats ahead 4–3. He struck out Eric Young to end the inning. He came back to pitch a scoreless seventh and got two outs in the eighth when he allowed a single and Storen got the call for a four-out close. (Win probability added .324)
Worst meltdown:
Collin Balester (August 26, 4–3 loss to the Reds in Cincinnati). Called on to pitch the bottom of the ninth of a 3–3 tie, he started the inning with a groundout, then gave up three consecutive singles, allowing the Reds to walk off. (WPA –.360)
Clutch hit:
Ian Desmond (August 21, 5–4 win over the Phillies at home). The Nats were behind 4–3 with two outs in the bottom of the ninth when Desi stepped to the plate. With two strikes, he hit a game tying home run (WPA .489). The next inning, Jonny Gomes drove in the winning run with a walk-off hit by pitch. Honorable mention to Ryan Zimmerman for his walk-off grand slam against the Phils on August 19 (WPA .344).
Choke:
Wilson Ramos (August 17, 2–1 loss to the Reds at home). The bottom of the ninth, the Nats down by one, the bases loaded, one out, and Ramos grounds into a game-ending double play (WPA –.530).
Likely to cool off:
Todd Coffey – His batting average allowed on balls in play of .143 for August is not sustainable.
Likely to warm up:
Laynce Nix – In a bit of a slump in August with a BABIP for August of .222, which should rise if he can get healthy again.
Bryce Harper watch:
Hit .286/.368/.510 for Class AA Harrisburg in 14 games in August, before ending the month on the DL.
Stephen Strasburg watch:
He pitched five minor league rehab starts during August and is scheduled to return to the Nats and pitch on September 6.
Managers,
It’s getting late in the game, and your starter’s pitch count is getting high. It’s still a close game, you’ve got a runner on base, and your pitcher is coming to bat. Should you lift him for a pinch hitter?
Because calculating the win expectancies may be challenging even for a manager who majored in math, let me suggest that you use a simple rule of thumb. Ask yourself, “If my pitcher walks the first guy he faces in the next inning, will I lift him for a reliever?” If the answer is yes, then send in a pinch hitter now. The extra pitching value from leaving him in to face one or two or three more batters won’t be as great as the offensive value given up by having your pitcher bat in a high leverage situation.
Jim Riggleman used to get this strategy wrong, and yesterday Davey Johnson got it wrong as well.
July was a rough month for the Nats. The pitching was shaky throughout the month and several times imploded, while the offense continued to struggle. The team began the month having a plausible case for a wild card run and ended it five games below .500.
Except where noted, all statistics are for the month of July only.
Record:
11–15 (.423) for July – ending the month at 51–56 (.477) for the season.
Pythagorean Record:
10–16 (3.81 R/G – 4.73 RA/G).
MVP for July:
Tyler Clippard (0-0, 0.57 ERA, 12 G, 15-2/3 IP, 9.8 K/9, 2.9 BB/9, 0.6 HR/9, 0.64 WHIP, 0 of 4 inherited runners scored, 2.61 FIP, 3.43 xFIP, 1.0 rWAR, 8 shutdowns, 1 meltdown).
Most valuable position player:
Michael Morse (.344/.400/.533, 24 G, 100 PA, 2 HR, 12 R, 13 RBI, 159 wRC+, 0.8 fWAR). Wilson Ramos (.286/.348/.508) was also a candidate.
Most valuable starting pitcher:
Yunesky Maya (1 GS, 1–0, 0.00 ERA, 5-1/3 IP). Ok, I’m being facetious, but none of the regular starters did very well this month—John Lannan had the best ERA of Nats pitchers with two or more starts with 4.18 (the NL average this season is 3.81).
Best start this month:
Jordan Zimmermann (July 10, 2–0 win over Colorado at home, 6-1/3 innings, 4 H, 0 BB, 6 SO, Game score of 71).
Worst start:
Jason Marquis (July 3, 10–2 loss to Pittsburgh at home, 1-1/3 IP, 8 H, 7 R, 6 ER, 0 BB, 0 SO, Game score of 12).
Best shutdown:
Tyler Clippard (July 20, 3–2 loss to the Astros in Houston). Clip came into the game in the bottom of the eighth with the game tied 2–2, runners on first and second, and no outs. After a sacrifice bunt advanced the runners, he got the last two outs on a foul popup and a strikeout. He then pitched a scoreless ninth, striking out two (win probability added of .380). Two innings later, the Astros scored the winning run off Todd Coffey.
Worst meltdown:
Henry Rodríguez (July 7, 10–9 loss to the Cubs in Washington). He had the distinction of giving up the go-ahead run twice. Entering in the top of the eighth with the score tied 8–8, Rodríguez gave up a two-out double to Starlin Castro followed by a run-scording single to Aramis Ramírez. In the bottom of the eighth the Nats tied it again 9–9, and Rodríguez came out to work the ninth. Giving up a single to Geovany Soto and a double to Darwin Barney, the Cubs took a 10–9 lead that they wouldn’t yield (WPA of –.516).
Clutch hit:
Danny Espinosa (July 17, 9–8 loss to the Braves in Atlanta). It was the top of the sixth, two outs, Roger Bernadina on first, and the Nats behind 7–6. Espinosa hit a home run to give the Nats the lead (WPA of .336). Alas, his clutch hit turned out be in vain as the Braves came back to tie it in the eighth and knocked in the winning run in the bottom of the ninth.
Choke:
Jayson Werth (July 9, 2–1 loss to the Rockies at home). In the bottom of the ninth with one out, runners on first and third, and the Nats down 2–1, Werth grounded into a game-ending double play (WPA of –.452). Lots of booing.
Clutch baserunning:
Jayson Werth (July 4, 5–4 win over the Cubs at home). In the bottom of the tenth, Werth walked, was advanced to second by a Liván Hernández sacrifice, stole third, and then scored the walk-off run on a wild pitch.
Likely to cool off:
Rick Ankiel – An unsustainable batting average on balls in play of .432 contributed to his July average of .327.
Likely to warm up:
Todd Coffey – His opponents’ batting average on balls in play of .405 for July also probably won’t persist.
Transactions:
Jason Marquis was traded to Arizona, and Jerry Hairston, Jr. to Milwaukee. The Nats picked up Jonny Gomes from Cincinnati—all for prospects—and the Nats released Matt Stairs.
Bryce Harper watch:
Promoted to Class AA Harrisburg on July 4 (and skipping high-A Potomac), Bryce Harper hit .238/.303/.325 in 23 games in the Eastern League.
Nats Noodles 